Market-Based Corrective Actions
By Philip Bond, Itay Goldstein, E. Prescott. 2010
251 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1b941888e99b8d598c696dcb442fd800e75a3558
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Alex Edmans
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Itay Goldstein
- W. Guay
- Wei Jiang
- Joseph P. Weber
- Emre Ozdenoren
- Kathy Yuan
In Finance
- Itay Goldstein
- Alex Edmans
- Emre Ozdenoren
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- W. Guay
- Wei Jiang
- Kathy Yuan
- George G. Pennacchi
Citations in the corpus
- Incentives for Information Production in Markets where Prices Affect Real Investment (2016, unknown): “()+ () ( (− )− + ) (8)”
- E¢ cient Recapitalization (2010, unknown): “We note that the government cannot simply use observed market prices to implement the intervention because its intervention may in turn a¤ect prices (see Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) and Bond and Goldstein (2010)).”
- Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises (2014, unknown): “Moreover, public information crowds out private incentives to acquire information, which may prevent inefficient runs (He and Manela, 2013) but can also adversely affect the ability of the government to learn from market prices (Bond et al., 2010; Goldstein et al., 2011; Bond and Goldstein, 2012).”
- Contingent Capital: The Case of COERCs (2014, background): “18As in Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010), if a government intervention at the time of conversion changes the total value of the bank’s assets, no equilibrium or multiple equilibria may reappear.”
- The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “Bond et al. (2009) show that whenever a decision maker such as the board takes a “corrective action” (e.g., replacing the CEO) on the basis of information inferred from the market price of the firm’s securities, there is a - 71 ‐ complementarity between market information and the decision maker’s…”
- The Real Effects of Financial Markets (2012, unknown): “In a recent paper, Davis, Korenok, and Prescott (2011) provide a first step in this direction by performing a lab experiment to test the predictions of Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) and Sundaresan and Wang (2011).”
- Trading Frenzies and Their Impact on Real Investment (2013, background): “The specific functional form assumed here is close to that in Dasgupta (2007) and Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski (2006) .”
- Hedge Fund Activism: A Review (2010, unknown): “See Coffee (1991), Bhide (1993), and Kahn and Winton (1998) for models that predict the opposite (i.e., discouraging) effect of liquidity on shareholder activism.”
- Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger (2013, background): “This is a specific example of the general problem noted by Bond et al. (2010), who show that policies based on market prices are potentially problematic.”
- The Real Effects of Financial Markets: The Impact of Prices on Takeovers (2012, background): “Equilibrium outcomes in settings where the combination of the trigger effect and anticipation effect becomes self-defeating have been analyzed by Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010).”