Agency Problems at Dual‐Class Companies

By Ron Masulis, Cong Wang, Feixue Xie. 2009

574 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3e31e3b230d6f29cfc67a71067262e6d5a1babf7

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Citations in the corpus

Large controlling shareholders and stock price synchronicity (2014, unknown): “…tunneling (Bertrand et al., 2002), outright theft (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Johnson et al., 2000), inefficient empire building acquisitions (Masulis et al., 2009), the misuse of cash stockpiles (Attig et al., 2009), and higher employee remuneration (Cronqvist et al., 2009), among other…”
Quantifying Private Benefits of Control from a Structural Model of Block Trades (2010, unknown): “Except for Mikkelson and Regassa (1991), all previous studies of the block premium combine minority with majority blocks.”
Corporate cash holdings: Causes and consequences (2015, unknown): “Using a sample of 2,440 US firms with a dual class share structure over the 1995-2003 period, Masulis et al. (2009) find that when managers' voting rights increase relative to their cash flow rights, the value of cash holdings declines.”
Ownership Structure and Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Structural Estimation (2011, background): “Masulis et al. (2009) find evidence that insiders with excess control rights waste corporate resources at the expense of shareholders in the pursuit of private benefits.”
The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Firm Value: The Role of Customer Awareness (2012, unknown): “Given that advertising expenditures do not have to be disclosed if they are immaterial , we follow the literature and set it equal to zero when missing (see, for example, Fee et al. 2009, Hale and Santos 2009, Masulis et al. 2009).”
Acquisition Announcements and Stock Market Valuations of Acquiring Firms’ Rivals: A Test of the Growth Probability Hypothesis in China (2011, unknown): “Our use of a five-day event window is consistent with other studies in this area (e.g., Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2009).”
One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (2007, unknown): “17 In a recent working paper, Masulis et al. (2007) find evidence that CEOs of dual-class firms in the”
The Influence of Governance on Investment: Evidence from a Hazard Model (2011, background): “More recently, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009) show that acquirers with worse governance experience more negative announcement returns to their bids.”
Disproportional Ownership Structure and Pay-Performance Relationship: Evidence from China's Listed Firms (2011, background): “With US dual-class firms, Masulis et al. (2009) find that the divergence between an insider’s control and cash flow rights has a positive effect on CEO pay, while from a sample of Italian listed firms, Barontini and Bozzi (2010) acknowledged that there is a negative effect.”
Do Analysts Matter for Governance? Evidence from Natural Experiments (2015, methodology): “Following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Masulis et al. (2009), we also include the interaction between and a measure of financial constraint, which is a dummy variable with one indicating that the firm’s Whited and Wu (2006) financial constraint index (WW index) is in the top tercile of the sam”