Interorganizational Trust, Governance Choice, and Exchange Performance

By Ranjay Gulati, Jack A. Nickerson. Organ. Sci., 2008

639 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7a0fbae189ee33544faef5060331a7064f9c978e

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In Management Information Systems

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

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Citations in the corpus

Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities (2012, positive): “3 strategy literature, many authors have drawn on related ideas to analyze long, productive relationships between firms (e.g., Dyer, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008).”
Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and transaction cost economics – 25 years on: reflections in memory of Oliver Williamson (2021, background): “For example, Gulati and Nickerson (2008) found that automobile component manufacturers opted for less rather than more formal governance structures when they had high trust in the buyers.”
The business model: Present and future—beyond a skeumorph (2013, background): “In these nontraditional contexts, control is more likely shared among model participants (e.g. making trust a substitute and complement to traditional hierarchical control; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008) as are intellectual property and decision rights (Mendelson, 2000).”
Organizational trust and performance: Is organizational learning capability a missing link? (2013, background): “Ultimately, the literature has suggested that organizational trust is necessary for the proper operation of organizations (Arrow, 1974; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008).”
Does familiarity breed trust? Revisiting the antecedents of trust (2008, background): “This interest has resulted in new research from a variety of disciplinary perspectives that include social psychology (e.g., Kramer, 1999; Lount et al., 2005), organizational theory and strategy (Uzzi, 1997; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Gulati and Nickerson, 2005; Gulati, 2007), business history ”
Theories of the Firm-Market Boundary (2011, neutral): “While empirical work has begun to tease apart when formal devices such as contracts complement the formation of trust and when they undermine trust (Lazzarini et al, 2004; Fehr and Gachter, 2000 ; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008 ), there remains much research to be done in this domain.”
Trust and relational embeddedness: Exploring a paradox of trust pattern development in key supplier relationships (2013, background): “This positions trust at the heart of relational governance (Poppo & Zenger, 2002) because of its ability to enhance performance regardless of governancemode (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008).”
Competence- and Integrity-Based Trust in Interorganizational Relationships: Which Matters More? (2018, background): “Given that IOR partners cannot specify in formal contracts much of what they seek from each other, it is perhaps not surprising that research has found that trust in one’s partner is essential for IOR success (e.g., Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Woolthuis, Hillebrand, & Nooteboom, 2005).”
How to Design Franchise Contracts: The Role of Contractual Hazards and Experience (2012, positive): “…on inter-firm relationships has identified two types of safeguard mechanism for overcoming these problems: formal contracts and relational governance mechanisms (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Dyer, 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; Mesquita & Brush, 2008).”
Crossing the Rubicon: exploring the factors that shape academics' perceptions of the barriers to working with industry (2012, background): “Where trust is present it is possible to work without complex or highly detailed contracts or agreements, and consequently to start projects more quickly, at a lower transactional cost (Sako and Helper, 1998; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008).”
Competing for Government Procurement Contracts: The Role of Corporate Social Responsibility (2018, neutral): “For further details on regulations before Citizens United, see Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder Jr (2003) and Federal Election Commission (2007).”
Toward a unified theory of project governance: economic, sociological and psychological supports for relational contracting (2012, result): “This argument is consistent with a growing body of recent literature highlighting the complementarity of formal and informal governance mechanisms (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008).”