The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence from Sudden Deaths
By Bang Dang Nguyen, Kasper Meisner Nielsen. 2010
525 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b76a9b34932535ef1887339adeab40396dcb1edb
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Ronald W. Masulis
- V. Atanasov
- Feixue Xie
- Cong Wang
- Bernard S. Black
- Kangtao Ye
- P. Francisco
- Eduardo B. Couto
In Finance
- V. Atanasov
- Feixue Xie
- Cong Wang
- Bernard S. Black
- Kangtao Ye
- P. Francisco
- Eduardo B. Couto
- Suman Neupane
Citations in the corpus
- Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate Finance and Accounting Research (2015, background): “Among the eight papers that use non-legal shocks, three rely on sudden death (Faccio and Parsley, 2009; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010; Salas, 2010); two use financial crises (Baek et al., 2004; Lemmon and Lins, 2003), one uses the outcome of a close presidential election (Goldman et al., 2009), one uses…”
- Forced Board Changes: Evidence from Norway (2011, unknown): “Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) and Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) show that shareholders value the very independence of an outside director, over and above the individual skills and competence of that director.”
- Independent Boards and Innovation (2017, background): “Whether such intensified board monitoring is beneficial or detrimental to shareholder wealth is less clear and may depend on the complexity of a firm's operations (Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash, 2011; Duchin, Matsusaka , and Oguzhan, 2010; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010).”
- Corporate governance reform and risk-taking: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in an emerging market (2020, background): “The valueenhancing effect of independent directors increases when CGR mandates crucial roles for them, such as sitting on audit committees (Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010).”
- Board Hierarchy, Independent Directors, and Firm Value: Evidence from China (2016, background): “Independent directors are a valuable feature of corporate governance (Nguyen and Nielsen 2010; Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis 2013).4 Weisbach (1988) finds that CEOs are more likely to be removed after poor earnings or stock performance if at least 60% of the company’s directors are outsiders.”
- Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Risk (2016, unknown): “For example, Nguyen and Nielsen (2010) investigate stock price reactions to sudden deaths and conclude that independent directors are generally viewed as being beneficial to the firm.”
- Globalizing the Boardroom - The Effects of Foreign Directors on Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (2012, background): “…include, e.g., Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994), Bhagat and Black (1999), Core, Holthausen, Larcker (1999), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Adams and Ferreira (2009), Hwang and Kim (2009), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2010), and Nguyen and Nielsen (2010).”