Board of Directors and Opportunistic Earnings Management: Evidence from India

By J. Sarkar, Subrata Sarkar, K. Sen. 2008

315 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9c72a521da02ad5babbdd391fc3778c6490d767b

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Citations in the corpus

How do the ownership structure and board of directors' features impact earnings management? The Spanish case (2020, unknown): “…suggesting the negative relationship between board size and earnings management practices (Byard, Li, & Yu, 2011; Chiu, Teoh, & Tian, 2013; Cunha & Piccoli, 2017; García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007; Sarkar, Sarkar, & Sen, 2008; Shah, Butt, & Hasan, 2009).”
Corporate Governance and Audit Report Lag in Malaysia (2010, unknown): “These include Forker (1992), Ho and Wong (2001), Gul and Leung (2004), Abdelsalam and Street (2007), Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007), Huafang and Jinguo (2007) and Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen (2008).”
CEO's financial experience and earnings management (2013, background): “Some previous empirical studies on emerging markets (including China and India) show that board characteristics, ownership structure, and other corporate governance variables significantly influence earnings management (Firth et al., 2007; Liu and Lu, 2007; Sarkar et al., 2008).”
Corporate social responsibility, real activities earnings management, and corporate governance: evidence from Korea (2016, background): “The composite CG index that we use includes the roles of the BOD and audit institutes, disclosure systems, protection of shareholders, and fair distribution of operating income.”
Audit Committee, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from India (2016, background): “Authors such as Balasubramanian et al., (2010); Lange and Sahu (2008) and Sarkar et al. (2006) opine that quality of the board is more important as compared to independence for improving firm performance.”