Reputation concerns of independent directors: : Evidence from individual director voting
By Wei Jiang, Hualin Wan, Shan Zhao. 2015
352 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2f74b937e06914335e46e30d60a918a872bee673
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Marc van Essen
- P. Duran
- Sabrina F. Saleh
- Canan C. Mutlu
- Haithem Nagati
- Mehdi Nekhili
- Tawhid Chtioui
- Mike W. Peng
In Finance
- Mehdi Nekhili
- Abul Shamsuddin
- P. Duran
- Moez Bennouri
- Mike W. Peng
- Haithem Nagati
- Muhammad Safiullah
- Marc van Essen
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Governance in China: A Meta‐Analysis (2018, background): “Outside directors’ sensitive monitoring is increasingly rewarded in the directors’ labour market via greater career opportunities and avoidance of regulatory sanctions (Jiang et al., 2016).”
- Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters? (2018, methodology): “Finally, we measure each female director’s reputation by followng the reputation measures for CEOs based on their press citations Milbourn, 20 03; Rajgopal et al., 20 06; Jiang et al., 2016 ).”
- Does the impact of board independence on large bank risks change after the global financial crisis (2017, neutral): “…literature focusing on the career concerns of independent directors and the market for directors offers a few reasons as to why the independent directors of large banks might be more effective in limiting excessive risk-taking post the global crisis (Jagannathan et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2015).”
- Risk in Islamic banking and corporate governance (2018, background): “Directors with a good reputation can act as monitoring specialists (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and help the management attain effective board governance (Jiang et al., 2016).”