The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Survey of Empirical Findings

By Jonathan M. Karpoff. 2001

400 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover (2003, background): “Evidence indicates some US institutional investors have become active in corporate governance in recent years (see Gillan and Starks (1998) and Karpoff (1999) for surveys of the shareholder activism literature).”
Corporate Governance and Control (2003, neutral): “In addition the contract allows for ex-post takeovers, which can be efficiency enhancing if [see Danielson and Karpoff (1998)].”
Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund (2009, neutral): “Karpoff (2001) concludes, “Most evidence indicates that shareholder activism [in the United States] can prompt small changes in target firms’ governance structures, but has negligible impact on share values and earnings.””
INVESTOR ACTIVISM, MANAGERIAL RESPONSIVENESS, AND CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE (2007, neutral): “Despite evidence that 72 percent of public pension fund proposals (Johnson and Greening, 1999) are settled, most studies of activism only examine proposals included on the proxy ( Karpoff, 2001 ), leaving the other two options unexplored.”
Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management (2011, result): “…involvement on earnings management, we shed light on the prior research's equivocal findings regarding shareholder activism's impact on firm performance (e.g. Gillan & Starks, 2007; Hoffmann et al., 2010; Karpoff, 2001), and ownership and performance respectively (e.g. Dalton et al., 2003).”
Agents watching agents?: evidence from pension fund ownership and firm value (2002, methodology): “For instance, Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) find that shareholders file corporate governance proposals at firms with higher institutional ownership, and Chidambaran and Woidtke (1998) find that corporate governance proposals receive more support when institutional ownership is higher.”
Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature (2004, neutral): “See Karpoff (1998) or Carleton et al. (1998) for discussion of shareholder activism and recent evidence on large institutional shareholders’ efforts to change corporate governance.”
Institutional ownership stability and BHC performance (2008, positive): “This trend has raised some interesting questions regarding the monitoring influence of institutional ownership on corporate governance and firm performance (Karpoff, 2001; Gillan and Starks, 2003).”
The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting and Compensation: The Case of Employee Stock Options Expensing (2009, background): “The empirical evidence from the 1980s and 1990s generally indicates a weak impact of shareholder proposals on the governance practices of targeted firms (Black 1998; Gillan and Starks 1998, 2007; Karpoff 2001; Romano 2001).”
Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the U.S.: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s (2001, neutral): “Karpoff (1998) summarizes the results of 20 empirical studies on the effects of formal shareholder proposals and private negotiations with firms, and finds evidence of, at best, only small effects on shareholder value.”
Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay (2011, background): “Studies from the 1980s and 1990s conclude that shareholder proposals are ineffective in eliciting change and improving performance at target firms (Black 1998; Karpoff 2001; Romano 2001; Gillan and Starks 2007).”