Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay

By Yonca Ertimur, F. Ferri, Volkan Muslu. 2011

382 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/05497472e311dc984110f20707d2fbdbf08f260d

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Citations in the corpus

Do Index Funds Monitor? (2021, background): “For example, Gillan and Starks (2000) find that shareholder proposals sponsored by institutions are more likely to be supported than shareholder proposals sponsored by individuals.”
CEO Pay and Firm Size: an Update after the Crisis (2013, neutral): “…has been a ‘change in sentiment’ over the usefulness of option-based pay – also related to the option backdating scandal – and an increase in compensation-related shareholder activism through shareholder proposals and vote-no campaigns against compensation committee members (Ertimur et al., 2011).”
The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans (2012, neutral): “Ertimur et al. (2010) find that voting support for the proposal (i.”
Say on Pay Laws, Executive Compensation, Pay Slice, and Firm Valuation around the World (2013, positive): “16 Stock return volatility is negatively related to CEO pay as in Fernandes et al. (2013), who argue that such negative correlation can result from the noise induced by CEO’s effect on firm performance and thus lower expected pay.”
Labor Unions, Political Representation, and Economic Inequality (2017, background): “Agrawal (2012) and Ertimur et al. (2011) present evidence that AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) affiliated union pension funds are particularly activist in opposing management positions in shareholder proxy votes, especially around compensation.”
The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design (2016, neutral): “See also Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2011) and Cai and Walkling (2011).”
Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, neutral): “21 Examining the effect of shareholder proposals on CEO compensation, Martin and Thomas (1999) and Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2011) find significant reduction or smaller increases in CEO pay at firms targeted by shareholder proposals that receive higher levels of voting support, call for a greater…”
The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation (2010, positive): “…is that, in the US, shareholders do not have a direct vote on executive pay, and although a few companies have voluntarily adopted non-binding ‘‘say on pay’’ measures, the vast majority has not.7 Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu (2009) examine the impact of non-binding ‘‘say on pay’’ votes on CEO pay.”
Connecting the Dots – Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle (2015, positive): “While some work finds that independent boards attract shareholder activism (Ertimur et al., 2011; Prevost & Rao, 2000), other studies report that the relationship is unclear (Bizjak & Marquette, 1998; Renneboog & Szilagyi, 2011).”
Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay (2013, positive): “This implies that at least some investors do not blindly 2009; Choi et al., 2010; Ertimur, Ferri and Maber, 2012), and 25% for compensation-related shareholder proposals (Ertimur et al. 2011).”
CEO Compensation, Family Control and Institutional Investors in Continental Europe (2012, neutral): “27 In an unreported analysis, we use the log of assets as a proxy for a firm’s size, as in Fernandes et al. (2012), and results are remarkably similar.”
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World (2015, neutral): “Miller (2008), Fischer et al. (2009), and Aggarwal et al.”
Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating (2012, methodology): “The large average effect of the RiskMetrics‘ recommendations observed in Model (2) is consistent with earlier studies of shareholder votes (Bethel and Gillan, 2002; Cai et al., 2009; Choi et al., 2009; Ertimur et al., 2011), raising the question of whether shareholders mechanically follow proxy advi”