Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund

By Marco Becht, Julian R. Franks, Colin Mayer, Stefano Rossi. 2009

479 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6ab332f22cd6b88a21fc212b180caeafd1a9667f

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Citations in the corpus

The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model (2013, unknown): “Most previous studies of hedge fund activism (see Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009; Becht et al., 2008) document that the cross-sectional variation in (abnormal) activist returns is influenced by the stated campaign objectives.”
Hedge Fund Activism: A Review (2010, unknown): “In addition, they find that the targets have higher operating profitability in terms of ROA and cash flow than the matched firms.”
The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance (2011, background): “…other investment funds have also been better known to rely on more controversial activist strategies, whereby they take positions in underperforming firms and target management directly (Brav et al., 2008; Becht et al., 2009; Greenwood and Schor, 2009; Klein and Zur, 2009; Bradley et al., 2010).”
One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2007, background): “Such allegations have recently been raised against activist hedge funds (Becht et al., 2006; Kahan and Rock, 2006).”
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors (2009, unknown): “Furthermore, our hedge fund target market returns are inconsistent with those reported by Becht et al. (2007) for the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund; they find that more than 40% of Hermes’ targets are in the bottom quintile of performance in the six months prior to this fund’s initial investment.”
Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance (2020, unknown): “Becht et al. (2010); Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998); McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016). 4 Past literature on the directorial labor market impact of poor monitoring by directors mostly focuses on extreme events such as earnings restatements (Srinivasan, 2005), financial fraud lawsuits (Fich”
Hometown advantage: The effects of monitoring institution location on financial reporting discretion (2011, unknown): “In another study, Becht et al. (2010) find that private negotiations with firms by a large activist institutional investor to remove CEOs were successful in more than 80% of the cases.”