Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover

By R. Parrino, Richard Sias, Laura T. Starks. 2003

874 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/321b8f56172ff91616183433dfe583c1e7707151

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Citations in the corpus

Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World (2015, positive): “For example, the negative coefficient on Differences in shareholder protection in model 2 supports the Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Bris and Cabolis (2008) notion that M&As can have country-level governance motives.”
Who Disciplines Bank Managers? (2009, positive): “This hypothesis is consistent with the literature on corporate governance, which underscores the monitoring role of institutional shareholders (e.g., Kini, Kracaw, and Mian, 2004; Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003).”
Government ownership and corporate governance: Evidence from the EU. (2012, neutral): “When financial institutions face too much resistance, they just “vote with their feet” and sell out (Parrino et al., 2003), damaging companies’ reputations.3 However, due to bureaucratic or social policies, government owners may be somewhat less mobile than these 3 See Black (1998) for a broad…”
Greener Pastures and the Impact of Dynamic Institutional Preferences (2003, background): “See Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993), Daniel et al. (1997), Wermers (1999, 2000), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Chakravarty (2000), Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) , and Sias, Starks, and Titman (2002).”
The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional investors around the world (2008, methodology): “To pursue this goal, we use a new comprehensive 1For analyses of the effects of selling shares on corporate governance, see Admati and Pfleiderer (2006) and Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003).”
Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds (2007, background): “(See Gillan and Starks (2000), Parrino et al. (2003), and the references therein for an examination of institutional investor voting behavior.)”
The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance (2011, background): “At one extreme of the continuum, shareholders can simply vote with their feet by selling their shares (Parrino et al., 2003).”
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Firm Transparency and Information Production (2015, positive): “This restriction attenuates their ability to follow the “Wall Street Rule” and sell shares of benchmarked firms that exhibit problems (Parrino et al., 2003).”
Shari’ah supervision, corporate governance and performance : conventional vs. Islamic banks (2015, background): “Weisbach (1988), Volpin (2002), and Parrino et al. (2003) advocate that CEO turnover is more sensitive to shareholder losses for firms with greater board independence and larger institutional ownership because these external monitors’ fiduciary duty is to focus on the creation of shareholder value.”