Agents watching agents?: evidence from pension fund ownership and firm value

By Tracie Woidtke. 2002

420 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b540ee8a0709643400edbca0c7ce1c2f4d883101

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Citations in the corpus

Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter? (2007, background): “However, Woidtke (2002) shows that firm value is only positively related to ownership by private pension funds.”
A tale of values-driven and profit-seeking social investors (2011, background): “…disappear. are plentiful: vulnerability to societal norms and public opinion (e.g., Malkiel and Quandt (1971), Teoh, Welch, and Wazzan (1998), Woidtke (2002), Hong and Kacperczyk (2009)), political values (Hong and Kostovetsky (2009)), the “psychic” and “emotional” return associated with…”
The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance (2011, background): “Public pension funds are often praised for their advocacy of shareholder interests, but Woidtke (2002) argues that political and social influences may divert their focus from disciplining”
Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict Between Shareholders (2010, neutral): “Woidtke (2002) finds supporting evidence for this claim by showing that public pension funds do not enhance firm value.”
Founding Family Ownership and the Agency Cost of Debt (2003, background): “Similarly, Woidtke (2002) explores the differing incentive structures of public versus private institutional investors. conflicts between the firm’s debt and equity claimants.7 Specifically, beyond the undiversified nature of their holdings, we argue that founding families are different from other…”
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview (2006, background): “From a broad perspective, Zingales (1998a) views governance systems as the complex set of constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the firm. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure ”
Stakeholder welfare and firm value (2010, methodology): “We therefore create a dummy equal to one when the relevant data is missing to control for the possibility that non-reporting firms are discretely different from reporting ones and to avoid a significant reduction in sample size (Himmelberg et al., 1999; Woidtke, 2002).”
Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership (2008, background): “Prior research indicates that differences among institutional owners largely reflect their legal types, relationships with the focal firm, investment horizons, and propensity for activism (David, Hitt, and Gimeno, 2001; David, Kochhar, and Levitas, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Woidtke, 2002).”
Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management (2011, neutral): “…(such as human rights, political influence, employment discrimination, etc.) tend to receive much less voter support than corporate governance proposals (Woidtke, 2002), for robustness reasons we also replicated all analyses using only the number of corporate governance proposals received.”
Institutional monitoring through shareholder litigation (2010, neutral): “Woidtke (2002) suggests that corporate pension fund administrators are controlled by the corporate management, and thus are under pressure not to target corporations.”