The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Financial Reporting and Compensation: The Case of Employee Stock Options Expensing

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Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay (2011, methodology): “26 Ferri and Sandino (2009) report a $2.3 million reduction in CEO pay in firms where a proposal to expense stock options was approved and Brav et al. (2008) document a $1 million decline in CEO pay in firms targeted by hedge funds activists (a significant amount considering that these firms are…”
Connecting the Dots – Bringing External Corporate Governance into the Corporate Governance Puzzle (2015, unknown): “Ferri and Sandino (2009) uncover that firms that are targeted with proposals to”
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance (2010, background): “However, shareholder compensation proposals typically have not attracted large voting support, and their effect on compensation and company performance has been mixed at best, as discussed in Ferri & Sandino (2009).”
Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay (2013, unknown): “%) in the 23 Mean and median voting turnout is about 80%, consistent with other studies (e.g. Ferri and Sandino, 2009). presence of a For recommendation.”