Framing effects on adolescent task representations, analytic and heuristic processing, and decision making: Implications for the normative/descriptive gap
By P. Klaczynski. 2001
96 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, General Decision Sciences
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6f3a7d425d61549b3a2dca6caa0c6c3621b7d495
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Wim De Neys
- Walter Schaeken
- Géry d'Ydewalle
- J. Jacobs
- Kinga Morsanyi
- P. Klaczynski
- Ty W. Boyer
- Dustin Albert
In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
- J. Jacobs
- J. Hamilton
- M. Donati
- Francesca Chiesi
- Caterina Primi
- Kinga Morsanyi
- Wim De Neys
- Jonathan Evans
In General Decision Sciences
- Wim De Neys
- Walter Schaeken
- Géry d'Ydewalle
- Jonathan Evans
- J. Jacobs
- J. Hamilton
- M. Donati
- Francesca Chiesi
Citations in the corpus
- The development and testing of a new version of the cognitive reflection test applying item response theory (irt). (2016, background): “Although the present results are in line with earlier studies which investigated developmental changes in heuristic reasoning between adolescence and adulthood (e.g., Chiesi et al., 2011; Klaczynski, 2001a; Morsanyi & Handley, 2013), it should be noted that the groups not only differed in their age.”
- Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition. (2008, unknown): “71(5):1347–66 Klaczynski PA. 2001.”
- The Development of Judgment and Decision Making During Childhood and Adolescence (2002, background): “Nonnormative reasoning includes a variety of heuristics, biases, and errors that have no basis in formal reasoning (see Klaczynski, 2001b, or Stanovich, 1999, for detailed discussions of normative vs. biased reasoning).”
- Working memory and everyday conditional reasoning: Retrieval and inhibition of stored counterexamples (2005, background): “Typically, previous demonstrations of people’s ability to adhere to the normative standard of first-order logic have explicitly instructed people to adhere to this norm (Evans & Over, 1996; Markovits et al., 2002; Stanovich & West, 1998; but see Klaczynski, 2001b).”