An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation

By Eitan Moshe Goldman, Steve Slezak. 2006

428 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/68c0c238def7d55e1c512dbf6b2adcc547bbf8cf

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs (2010, background): “A number of papers link fraud to equity compensation for executives (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006, Goldman and Slezak 2006, Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 2007, Peng and Röell 2008, Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker 2009, and 4 Johnson, Ryan, and Tian 2009).”
CEO Incentives and Earnings Management (2006, methodology): “See Goldman and Slezak (2004) for a recent theoretical model in which optimal CEO stock ownership is chosen in order to balance the incentive to supply effort and the incentive to misreport performance.”
Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation (2012, neutral): “Goldman and Slezak(2006) show that the manager may misrepresent the state of the firm to increase the value of his equity-based compensation.”
Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China (2015, positive): “Goldman and Slezak (2006) argue that the optimal payfor-performance sensitivity, maximizing firm value, is a trade-off between the benefits arising from managerial effort and the cost of inflating firm performance.”
Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth (2007, positive): “We also find that optionbased CEO compensation increases fraud probability -- similar to results in Burns and Kedia (2005) and arguments in Goldman and Slezak (2005) who present a model in which incentivebased compensation can create incentives to commit financial fraud.”
Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation (2013, neutral): “Net firm value as expressed in equation (24) is maximized over the three parameters of the employment contract {ω, μ, η}, subject to the participation constraint that the manager’s expected utility (equation 22) attains his reservation level U , indexed in money terms by a reservation wage W implici”
Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, background): “For example, Goldman and Slezak (2006) develop an agency model in which stock- based compensation is a double-edged sword, inducing managers to work harder in some cases, but to engage in fraud in others.”
Stock Option Vesting Conditions, CEO Turnover, and Myopic Investment (2012, background): “CEO replacement: When the board observes the realization of the first-period outcome, x1, it decides whether or not to replace the incumbent with a new CEO.”