Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation
By David L. Dicks. 2012
129 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7da1b6b30f33b2767869f0c7fd6f224cf9e47cec
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Citations in the corpus
- The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance (2016, background): “To study the e¤ect of transparency, we extend the basic model and assume that if a director exerts e¤ort, shareholders get control only with some probability.”
- Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent (2016, unknown): “The fact that competition for scarce talent in our model introduces an externality in wage setting is reminiscent of the corporate governance externalities formalized by Acharya and Volpin (2009) and Dicks (2012).”
- Internalizing governance externalities: The role of institutional cross-ownership (2019, unknown): “Acharya and Volpin (2010) and Dicks (2012) argue that managerial labor market competition generates corporate governance externalities.”