CEO Incentives and Earnings Management

By Daniel Bergstresser, Thomas Philippon. 2006

2,315 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/576cf12cc1451af2f36f3dff4cc12a72e83760c4

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Citations in the corpus

Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, background): “Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find a positive relationship between the sensitivity of a CEO’s equity portfolio to changes in stock price (delta) and earnings management; Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) find a positive relationship between a CEO’s portfolio…”
Evidence on Contagion in Earnings Management (2015, background): “On a related note, most extant work on financial misreporting (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Cheng and Warfield 2005; Karpoff, Lee and Martin 2008a, 2008b) implicitly assumes that a manager narrowly considers his expected benefits such as job security, or compensation…”
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, neutral): “Based on observational studies, there appears to be a positive correlation between stock and option holdings and earnings manipulation (Cheng and Wareld, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007; Peng and Röell, 2008; Johnson, Ryan, and Ti”
Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences (2010, background): “Equity-based compensation including executive stock options (ESOs): Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that firms in which the CEO’s total compensation consists mainly of the value of stock options report large discretionary accruals and that these CEOs tend to exercise more stock options and se”
CEO Duality, Agency Costs, and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency (2019, positive): “Incentive Ratio : CEO’s equity-based incentive ratio is estimated as in Bergstresser and Philippon (2006).”
Where do firms manage earnings? (2012, neutral): “7 Studies examining the absolute value of discretionary accruals include Dechow and Dichev (2002), Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002), Klein (2002), Chung and Kallapur (2003), Myers, Myers, and Omer (2003), Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). As discussed later, ”
CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk (2016, positive): “In particular, we calculate and include the strength of CEO stock incentives (INCENTIVE_STK) and option incentives (INCENTIVE_OPT) following the methodology of Bergstresser and Philippon (2006).”
Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China (2015, neutral): “On the one hand, a positive effect has been found in, for example, Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns and Kedia (2006), and Armstrong et al. (2013).”
Is Earnings Quality Associated with Corporate Social Responsibility (2012, neutral): “, Carroll 1979; Jones 1995; Garriga and Melé 2004; Mackey et al. 2007) provides theoretical background integrating ethical expectations of business into a rational economic and legal framework. For instance, Carroll (1979) proposes a model that delineates a firm’s social obligations, including econo”
The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality (2015, background): “CEOowner is positively associated with DD, which reconciles with the prior evidence (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon 2006) that higher CEO equity ownership is associated with lower accruals quality.”
Agency Theory of Overvalued Equity as an Explanation for the Accrual Anomaly (2006, neutral): “10 Additional examples of firms inflating earnings to sustain stock price, and thus benefit from option exercise or share sales, include Xerox, Tyco, and Waste Management (see Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006).”