Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships

By Marina Halac. 2012

201 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ecd545cfec63f49221c457fb9ba1dabca829037b

Citations in the corpus

• Management Practices, Relational Contracts, and the Decline of General Motors (2014, unknown): “…optimal relational contract has an insider-outside form where some suppliers are “insiders” who are used routinely and the rest are “outsiders”, who are never used, even in periods where they are more efficient; if the parties become more patient, the set of insiders grows and efficiency improves.”
• Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities (2012, unknown): “…contracts can facilitate efficient behaviors, both on their own (e.g., Bull (1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), Levin (2003), Fuchs (2007), and Halac (2011)) and in combination with formal aspects of organizations and contracts (e.g., Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994, 1999, 2002, 2011)); see…”
• The Value of Relationships: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports (2015, unknown): “…problems (see, e.g., MacLeod and Malcomsom (1989), Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994, 2002), Levin (2003)), insurance considerations (see, e.g., Thomas and Worrall (1988)), or uncertainty over parties commitment to the relationship (see, e.g., Ghosh and Ray (1996), Watson (1999), Halac (2012)).”
• Blockchain Governance—A New Way of Organizing Collaborations? (2020, unknown): “Especially as the global and corporate information infrastructure has become increasingly digitalized (Tilson et al. 2010) — with an increasingly prevalent use of the internet, electronic data interchange (EDI) networks, and electronic markets (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010) —”