The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations

By Mara Faccio, Larry H. P. Lang. 2002

3,676 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/630cfe5aebe7768b3af59fc661e13055aa7a0fce

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Citations in the corpus

Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites? (2007, background): “This view is supported by Barca and Becht’s (2001) description of ownership and control of European firms (see also Faccio and Lang, 2002), and by the evidence in Claesens et al. (2000 and 2002) on the ownership and control of Asian firms.”
International Evidence on the Non-Linear Impact of Leverage on Corporate Cash Holdings (2007, background): “Consequently, in the presence of a large shareholder, 4 There is also evidence that there are substantial differences in the nature of ownership across the countries in our sample (see, for example, Claessens et al, 2000 for Japan and Faccio and Lang, 2002 for others).”
One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (2007, neutral): “…voting rights is the application of the so-called “weakest link” principle (Claessens et al. 2000): if a 5 For additional evidence on the prevalence of deviations from “one share-one vote,” see Barca and Becht (2001) and Faccio and Lang (2002) for Western Europe, and Morck et al. (2000) for Canada.”
Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives (2015, neutral): “…managers and instead rely on the restricted pool of family ðor social networkÞ members, in our case, performance may be affected 8 For evidence on the relevance of family ownership, see La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer ð1999Þ, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang ð2000Þ, and Faccio and Lang ð2002Þ.”
How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled (2009, background): “…and control rights: dual-class stock studies [e.g., DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985); Partch (1987); Doidge (2004); and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2008)] and ultimate ownership studies [La Porta, López de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999); Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000); and Faccio and Lang (2002)].”
Corporate Governance and Control (2003, neutral): “They find no effects for European countries [Faccio and Lang (2002)] and a negative effect of large investors in Asia [Claessens et al. (2000)]. 163 La Porta et al. (1999b) run a Q-regression for 27 countries but neither the cash-flow rights of controlling blockholders nor the legal system have a si”
Private vs State Ownership and Earnings Management: evidence from Chinese listed companies (2007, background): “…owner that has effective control of the firm, as is the case in most countries around the world (La Porta et al. , 1998; Claessens et al. , 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002), the nature of the agency problem turns into conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholders and the minority…”
State ownership reinvented? Explaining performance differences between state‐owned and private firms (2018, neutral): “We are thus essentially finding the “ultimate” state owners that have actual control (voting) rights in each focal firm (Faccio & Lang, 2002).”
Corporate Social Performance and Innovation with High Social Benefits: A Quantitative Analysis (2010, background): “These issues are even more relevant, since the large majority of firms worldwide are family owned or family managed (Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).”
Earnings Management within Multinational Corporations (2018, background): “The corporate structures of MNCs are often very complex (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002).”
To what extent does corporate liquidity affect M&A decisions, method of payment and performance? Evidence from China (2017, methodology): “36 Turning to the deal’s characteristics, consistent with Faccio and Lang (2002), Harford et al. (2009) and Karampatsas et al.(2014), we observe that the variable regarding the targets’ listing status (Public_deals) has negative and significant coefficients in all specifications, suggesting that in ”
Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations (2007, positive): “Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Faccio and Lang (2002). Cash-flow-1 Cash flow rights of largest controlling shareholder using 10% cutoff for control. Zero if no controlling shareholder. Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Faccio and Lang (2002). Control-1 minus Cash-flo”
CEO Compensation, Family Control and Institutional Investors in Continental Europe (2012, positive): “In particular, families own large, and often controlling, equity stakes in most of the listed firms across Continental Europe (Faccio and Lang, 2002, and Barca and Becht, 2001).”