How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled

By Belén Villalonga, Raphael Amit. 2009

481 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0db2cc6c6cc3f2eae0f3c26baa8ccc6bb5ee7cf7

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Family firms in the global economy: Toward a deeper understanding of internationalization determinants, processes, and outcomes (2018, background): “However, in family firms, type-II agency costs (Villalonga and Amit, 2009) are amplified”
Family Control of Firms and Industries (2010, unknown): “Using the same definition, Anderson and Reeb (2003) document that founding families are present in one-third of the S&P 500; Villalonga and Amit (2006, 2009) find that among Fortune 500 firms,”
CEO Compensation, Family Control and Institutional Investors in Continental Europe (2012, background): “Part of the literature shows that the overall effect of family control on firm performance is positive (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Andres, 2008; Villalonga and Amit, 2009).”
Capital structure decisions in family firms: empirical evidence from a bank-based economy (2011, unknown): “17 The nomenclature follows Villalonga and Amit (2009).”
Family Control, Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Publicly Traded Firms (2014, background): “…conflict has also been highlighted by research examining the use of dual-class shareholdings by founding family owners, which demonstrates that multiple classes of stock allow the family to create a wedge between shareholding (and associated cash-flows) and firm control (Villalonga and Amit 2009).”
Governance of Family Firms (2015, background): “Villalonga & Amit (2009) provide evidence in support of this point: They find that the percentage difference between the Tobin’s q of family firms and nonfamily firms in an industry (the industry’s “family premium”) averages 12% for founding family–owned firms but only 2% for nonfounding…”
Doing More with Less: Innovation Input and Output in Family Firms (2016, unknown): “In the United States, for instance, 40% of all publicly listed firms are family firms (Villalonga & Amit, 2009).”
Are Family Firms Good Employers (2017, background): “Risk aversion can be attributed to the effects of concentrated wealth (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988), as well as limited liquidity and reduced access to capital (Miller et al., 2008; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006, 2009).”
Family Control and Financing Decisions (2011, unknown): “Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Barontini and Caprio (2006), show that use of control‐enhancing mechanisms such as multiple share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements, tend to substantially reduce family‐own firm value.”
The Ability and Willingness Paradox in Family Firm Innovation (2015, background): “Introduction Owing to the importance of innovation for economic growth and the ubiquity of the family form of governance (La Porta et al., 1999; Villalonga and Amit, 2009), scholars are paying increasing attention to innovation management in family firms (De Massis et al.”