Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations

By Luc Laeven, Ross Levine. Social Science Research Network, 2007

583 citations recorded by the source corpus.

The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9699aa1289338b3361ac3c286c40b0476f129bfa

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Citations in the corpus

Disproportional Ownership Structure and Pay-Performance Relationship: Evidence from China's Listed Firms (2011, background): “Similar results were also provided by Lemmon and Lins (2003), Laeven and Levine (2008) and Gompers et al. (2010).”
Family Ownership and Control, the Presence of Other Large Shareholders, and Firm Performance: Further Evidence (2011, background): “In some economies, such as Western Europe, other large shareholders are present in more than 40% of public companies, especially when the firms are family enterprises (Laeven & Levine, 2008).”
Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing (2011, unknown): “Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Laeven and Levine (2008), we define a shareholder as “large” if its direct and indirect voting rights sum to 10% or more.”
Cash flows and leverage adjustments (2016, background): “As emphasized by Laeven and Levine (2008) and Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), capital ownership plays an important role for financial performance and such F. Amini Sharifi and S. M. Jafari / Accounting 2 (2016) 165 studies must be repeated to better understand the effect of capital ownership on firms…”
Being a Foreigner Among Domestic Banks: Asset or Liability? (2009, unknown): “Ownership structures and other corporate governance aspects have been found to affect bank performance (Laeven and Levine, 2008).”
Complex Ownership and Capital Structure (2012, unknown): “4Faccio and Lang (2002) define a family controlled firm to be “a family or a firm that is unlisted Similar to Laeven and Levine (2008) we identify pyramids with second largest owner at 10% and 20% level of control.”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, methodology): “By definition, the variables WEDGE and MLS-related variables are equal to zero for these firms (e.g., Boubaker and Labégorre, 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Lin et al., 2013).”
Exit as Governance: An Empirical Analysis (2010, unknown): “Our control variables are motivated by Laeven and Levine (2008). These include firm size defined as the log of market value of equity (Size).”
Do Family Firms Use Dividend Policy as a Governance Mechanism? Evidence from the Euro Zone (2012, background): “Since the pioneering work by Lintner (1956), the literature has generally accepted previous dividend levels as important determinants of current dividend payments.”
Bank Governance, Regulation, and Risk Taking (2009, unknown): “The wedge between voting and CF rights is used to gauge the degree to which owners have the power and incentives to expropriate bank resources (Caprio, Laeven, and Levine, 2007; and Laeven and Levine, 2007, 2008).”