CEO Compensation and Bank Mergers

By Richard T. Bliss, Richard J. Rosen. 2001

473 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5bacf48b5593a8b60f880d778b201d2ab541dcce

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Citations in the corpus

The Impact of Bank Consolidation on Commercial Borrower Welfare (2005, unknown): “For instance, bank executives may pursue acquisition strategies that improve their prestige or compensation (see Gorton and Rosen (1995) and Bliss and Rosen (2001)).”
Consolidation and Efficiency in the Financial Sector: A Review of the International Evidence (2003, background): “46 See also Boyd et al. (1993) and Santomero and Chung (1992). 47 See Boyd and Graham (1998).”
6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives (2009, background): “For example, in a study of banks, Bliss and Rosen (2001) found that whether growth in firm size occurred through mergers or non-merger growth, CEO compensation increased with growth, even though stock price typically declined after a merger announcement.”
Corporate Governance and Firm Cash Holdings (2006, unknown): “Nonetheless, as documented in Bliss and Rosen (2001) for acquisitions and Harford and Li (2006) for both acquisitions and large capital expenditures, CEO compensation and wealth increase after such investments, even if those investments destroy value.”
CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions (2011, background): “For the banking industry, Bliss and Rosen (2001) and Minnick et al. (2011) show that high-delta banks are less likely to engage in acquisitions, which is consistent with high-delta CEOs forgoing risky investment projects such as M&A.”
Managerial Risk Taking (2016, unknown): “In particular, some studies have shown that CEOs benefit from an acquisition regardless of the actual performance of the acquisition (Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Harford & Li, 2007) and appear to use acquisitions to increase their compensation (Seo et al., 2014).”
Australian Chief Executive Officer Remuneration: Pay and Performance (2006, background): “Some literature provides evidence supporting an alternative view, that CEOs grow their firms to achieve higher pay rather than because it is in the best interests of their shareholders ( Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004).”
CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses (2004, unknown): “Bliss and Rosen (2001) show that CEO compensation typically increases after bank mergers even if the acquirer’s stock price declines.”
Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US (2008, background): “Further, evidence in Bliss and Rosen (2001) and Harford and Li (2007) establishes that CEO compensation and wealth increase after acquisitions, even if those acquisitions destroy value. Given these incentives and the potential penalty from accumulating large cash reserves, weakly controlled managers”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “Bliss and Rosen (2001) examined pay related to acquisitions.”
CEO age and stock price crash risk (2017, background): “…motivation from prior literature suggesting that CEOs are highly concerned about firm performance because performance directly affects their current and future personal wealth through executive compensation packages (Bliss and Rosen, 2001; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Petrou and Procopiou, 2016).”