CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions

By Jens Hagendorff, Francesco Vallascas. 2011

211 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c3df359998ecb4a64d2efbbf364826633cf940ba

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Citations in the corpus

National culture and bank risk-taking (2017, unknown): “Bank risk positively affects the expected value of managerial compensation packages since bank executive remuneration relies heavily on equity-based pay schemes (Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Srivastav et al., 2014; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013).”
What’s in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance (2016, methodology): “Following prior literature, we scale Vega and Delta incentives by cash compensation since each incentive is a function of firm size8 (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Edmans et al., 2009; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011).”
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, unknown): “…financial crisis were not those financial firms that used equity-type compensation ( .e., restricted shares or stock options) for 31 Minnick et al. (2011) and Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs in mergers.”
Board structure and corporate risk taking in the UK financial sector (2017, methodology): “Keeping this in mind, we control for firm performance and include market-to-book ratio as a measure of corporate performance in our model (Hagendorff & Vallascas, 2011).”
CEO Power, Government Monitoring, and Bank Dividends (2016, background): “Recent contributions provide evidence of a nexus between CEO power and bank risk-taking ( Pathan, 2009 ), and CEO compensation incentives and bank risk-taking ( Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011 ). Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned to those of s”
Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: Evidence from the US Banking Sector (2013, unknown): “Similarly, research by Hagendorff and Va-llascas (2011) ﬁnds that between 1993 and 2007, CEOs of US banks increasingly engaged in risky business transactions, as the proportion of equity-based pay in their performance contracts rose.”