Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power

By Jan K. Brueckner. 2002

482 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management, Transportation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/53920bf799ad9027528181e2634ac56c520d68c3

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Citations in the corpus

Price-cap Regulation of Airports: Single-till Versus Dual-till (2006, background): “5Brueckner shows that the surcharge should be reciprocally proportional to the market shares of airlines [2].”
Private Port Pricing and Public Investment in Port and Hinterland Capacity (2007, unknown): “If this is the case, theory suggests that shipping companies would partly internalize congestion (Brueckner, 2002).”
Airport Deregulation: Effects on Pricing and Capacity (2008, background): “This efficient ‘congestion toll’ was first described by Brueckner (2002). It has the important feature that it diminishes with airlines' market shares (the larger the N, the larger the toll), showing that the scope for congestion pricing would be narrower that in the ‘road case’ where users do not h”
Internalization of Airport Congestion: A Network Analysis (2005, methodology): “See Brueckner (2002) for a discussion of the e®ects of relaxing the separability assumption.”
Entry Patterns in the Southwest Airlines Route System (2004, background): “However, while a large literature has evolved analyzing numerous aspects of the predominant hub-and-spoke model ( Brueckner, 2002; Brueckner and Spiller, 1994; Evans and Kessides, 1993; Ken Hendricks and Tan, 1995), few studies have explicitly studied non-hub-and-spoke airline networks.”
Price vs. quantity-based approaches to airport congestion management (2009, methodology): “The main simplification, which follows Brueckner and Van Dender (2008), is the assumption that carriers face perfectly elastic demands for air travel. This approach eliminates the flight-reducing distortion arising from the exercise of market power, allowing a sole focus on the distortion arising fr”
Airport capacity and congestion when carriers have market power (2006, background): “As Brueckner (2002) first pointed out, when carriers have market power, there would be no place (or only partially) for congestion pricing on the airport side.”
Atomistic Congestion Tolls at Concentrated Airports: Seeking a Unified View in the Internalization Debate (2008, unknown): “…hypothesis provides better empirical fit for MSP; competitive fringe explanation Daniel & Harback, 2007: further empirical support (more airports) Brueckner, 2002: theoretical model, empirical illustration: partial internalization Mayer & Sinai, 2003: empirical evidence for partial…”
Congestible facility rivalry in vertical structures (2007, unknown): “These results have already been obtained by Brueckner (2002) and others in the context of non-competing airports.”
REVENUE SHARING WITH MULTIPLE AIRLINES AND AIRPORTS (2010, background): “It follows from (11) that [1 ( / )] ( / ) j i i r w h R h = + + , 2 , 1 = i .”
Alternative Forms of Economic Regulation and their Efficiency Implications for Airports (2004, background): “6 Brueckner (2002) contains a very interesting analysis on this problem when airlines may have market power at an airport.”
History and Industry Location: Evidence from German Airports (2011, unknown): “See, for example, Brueckner (2002, 2004), Campbell (1996), Drezner and Drezner (2001), Hendricks, Piccone, and Tan (1999), and Hojman and Szeidl (2008).”