Internalization of Airport Congestion: A Network Analysis
By Jan K. Brueckner. Social Science Research Network, 2005
201 citations recorded by the source corpus.
The likely resurgence of air traffic in the U.S. means that airport congestion is a problem that must soon be confronted by policy makers. As part of their policy response, it is probable that some form of congestion pricing will be imposed at selected U.S. airports in the relatively near future. The theory developed in this paper, which extends the results of Brueckner (2002), provides an important guide for the formulation of congestion pricing rules. In particular, the theory says that the congestion tolls levied on the various airlines at a particular airport should generally be different, with the tolls being inversely related to a carrier’s airport flight share. Internalization of airport congestion is the reason for this inverse relationship. In operating another peak flight, a carrier takes account of the congestion damage imposed on the other flights it operates. If these flights account for a large share of the airport’s traffic, then most of the congestion created by the additional flight is internalized, justifying a low toll. By contrast, if the carrier operates only a few of the airport’s flights, then little internalization occurs, and a high toll is needed to force the carrier to take into account the congestion damage it causes. The resulting flight-share rule is easy to implement, and it could help policymakers design proper toll systems at U.S. airports.
Subfields: Aerospace Engineering, Economics and Econometrics, Transportation
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a7c9ac756c0ad4155075578b5dbae0e0bfc4e1e3
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Citations in the corpus
- Congestible facility rivalry in vertical structures (2007, unknown): “…the profit for carrier i at facility 0 is: 7 Earlier studies that have incorporated imperfect competition of carriers at a congestible airport (e.g., Brueckner, 2002, 2005; Pels and Verhoef, 2004; Basso, 2005; Zhang and Zhang, 2006; Basso and Zhang, 2006) have assumed Cournot behavior.”
- Airport Deregulation: Effects on Pricing and Capacity (2008, background): “This case will be denoted byW and has been the case usually studied in the airport pricing literature that considers airlines' market power, e.g. Brueckner (2002, 2005) and Pels and Verhoef (2004).”
- Price vs. quantity-based approaches to airport congestion management (2009, methodology): “11This toll pattern also obtains in a model with explicit peak and off-peak periods, as seen in the analysis of Brueckner (2005).”