CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of Incentive-Intensity, Relative Mix, and Economic Determinants

By S. Bryan, Lee-Seok Hwang, Steven B. Lilien. 2000

469 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/513b735324c0d068ab5c52b91ab31be95cfd032e

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Citations in the corpus

Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management Incentives (2003, background): “From this list, we excluded firms in the financial services sector and other regulated industries because of differences in production technologies and possibly earnings management incentives compared to firms in unregulated industries (Burgstahler and Eames [1998]).”
Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and its Role in Managerial Compensation (2006, methodology): “See the model of John and John (1993) and empirical evidence in numerous papers such as Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) and Ortiz-Molina (2004).”
A Model of Dynamic Compensation and Capital Structure (2011, unknown): “In addition, some indirect empirical evidence (Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien, 2000) is consistent with this view of ‘‘undoing’’ or ‘‘dynamically revising’’ the employment contract, which can be a potential topic for future empirical studies.29”
Capital structure, executive compensation, and investment efficiency (2013, background): “We first examine whether our data sample supports the positive connection between compensation leverage and firm leverage, as implied by the theories of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and John and John (1993), and as empirically found by Bryan et al. (2000) and Ortiz-Molina (2004).”
Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance (2001, result): “Also Bryan et al. (2000) provide evidence that granting behavior is consistent with agency-based predictions.”
Managerial Risk, Innovation, and Organizational Decline (2009, background): “Finally, given the propensity of innovation-based firms to rely on equity to fund their strategic activities (Bryan et al., 2000; Ittner et al., 2003), we included a measure of equity relative to debt (Equity).”
Moving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk (2008, background): “Similarly, finding that high-growth firms favor the use of stock options over restricted stock, Bryan et al. (2000) conclude that, whereas stock options provide efficient incentives, restricted stock “likely exacerbates the CEO’s unwillingness to take risky, yet positive net present value projects”…”
Incentive Compensation for Bank Directors: The Impact of Deregulation (2005, unknown): “Consistent with this, Bryan et al. (2000) find board member compensation is designed to reduce agency conflicts between shareholders and directors.”
Company reputation and the cost of equity capital (2014, unknown): “Examples include equity-based compensation and high pay-for-performance sensitivity (John and John 1993; Bryan et al. 2000; Ortiz-Molina 2007; Kose et al. 2010) and anti-takeover provisions (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.”
The Role of Accounting in the Design of CEO Equity Compensation (2007, methodology): “Bryan et al. (2000) use several measures similar to the first measure in Matsunaga (1995) and an interest coverage measure.”
CEO Compensation and Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Purchase Price Allocation (2010, unknown): “Alternative specifications Bryan et al. (2000) show that the relative importance of different forms of compensation is endogenously determined by firm characteristics.”