Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management Incentives

By Terry A. Baker, D. Collins, Austin L. Reitenga. 2003

226 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1a826cedd5e77ff874b4d42149f47178525fe5ce

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance and Backdating of Executive Stock Options (2009, unknown): “, Yermack, 1997; Anabtawi, 2004; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). In addition, some social and psychological factors can affect the effectiveness of the board and the compensation committee. For example, some boards have a tendency not to question CEO pay because board culture promotes collegiality and dis”
Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management (2011, background): “…to smooth earnings, as their bonuses and other performance-contingent compensation could suffer if their firms fall short of quarterly earnings forecasts (Zahra et al., 2005; Matsunaga & Park, 2001), or to obtain other private benefits, such as stock options compensation (Baker et al., 2003).”
Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation (2013, unknown): “But the temptation to manipulate stock prices is a perennial issue of concern that has come to the forefront again in a continuing spate of accounting scandals, of which Enron and WorldCom are only the most notorious: the GAO (2002, 2006) reports that substantive restatements of company accounts hav”
A study of earnings-management motives in the Anglo-American and Euro-Continental accounting models: The Canadian and French cases (2006, background): “Moreover, Backer et al. (2003) find that this association is stronger when managers are able to publicly announce earnings prior to the option-award date.”
Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences (2010, background): “(2003) find that discretionary accruals are lower prior to option grant dates, and the effect is stronger in settings in which the grant date is not predictable (Baker et al., 2003). Coles et al. (2006) examine discretionary accruals in quarters between the date of cancellation and subsequent reissu”
The Association Between Management Earnings Forecast Errors and Accruals (2009, background): “For instance, managers might manipulate accruals downward prior to share repurchases or stock option grants to boost potential gains from repurchased stocks or awarded stock options (Gong et al. 2008; Baker et al. 2003), and these firms may also provide pessimistic earnings forecasts prior to these ”
Abnormal real operations, real earnings management, and subsequent crashes in stock prices (2014, unknown): “Existing literature has already provided such evidence for AEM (see Jones 1991; Perry and Williams 1994; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Baker et al. 2003; Guan et al. 2005; Gong et al. 2008).”