Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments
By R. Cookson. 2000
267 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/50503e02f9d575ad447fcc35a3ac4c79e0e46005
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In Economics and Econometrics
- N. Hanley
- Bruno S. Frey
- Stephan Meier
- Mikoaj Czajkowski
- Jannike Falk-Petersen
- Roberto A. Weber
- Margrethe Aanesen
- Jacob LaRiviere
In General Decision Sciences
- Stephan Meier
- Jannike Falk-Petersen
- Bruno S. Frey
- Roberto A. Weber
- Margrethe Aanesen
- Mikoaj Czajkowski
- Jonathan Woon
- Jacob LaRiviere
In Safety Research
- Bruno S. Frey
- Stephan Meier
- Danila Serra
- Roberto A. Weber
- Mikoaj Czajkowski
- Jonathan Woon
- A. Barr
- N. Hanley
Citations in the corpus
- The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations (2004, unknown): “Pruitt, 1967, 1970; Selten and Berg, 1970; Andreoni, 1995; Elliot et al., 1998; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Park, 2000; Cookson, 2000 ).”
- Comparing Students to Workers: The Effects of Social Framing on Behavior in Distribution Games (2004, unknown): “Related experiments include Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999), Park (2000), and Cookson (2000) .”
- A Survey of Economic Theories and Field Evidence on Pro-Social Behavior (2006, unknown): “ The effect of contextual factors on pro‐social behavior is supported in various experiments in which framing the same decision differently has a critical influence on the decision (see Andreoni 1992; Cookson 2000).”
- An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods (2011, background): “11It is interesting to note that we do not observe the “restart” effect found in other studies (e.g., Cookson 2000).”
- The framing of games and the psychology of play (2011, unknown): “A common result is that in the Give treatment contributions to a repeatedly played public good are higher than in the Take treatment (cf. Fleishman, 1988; Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Cookson, 2000; Park, 2000).”
- How Many Winners are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage (2008, unknown): “To differentiate between both explanations a restart procedure could be used, i.e., the experiment is restarted after a certain number of rounds which is unknown to the subjects during the first part (see e.g. COOKSON 2000).”
- The value of familiarity: Effects of knowledge and objective signals on willingness to pay for a public good (2014, background): “10 Although beyond the scope of the current paper, information can also change the context or framing of a valuation decision, and thus change people’s responses to the valuation question (Cookson, 2000).”
- Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent (2006, unknown): “Cookson (2000) and Liberman et al. (2004) show that framing can affect contributions to public goods in some contexts but Abbink and Henning-Schmidt (2002) find no such effect in a “bribery game”.”
- Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games (2012, unknown): “In their Study 2, Dana et al. (2006) find that average transfers are 33 percent smaller under recipient unawareness, but the number of observations is too small for this difference to be statistically significant. When Koch and Norman (2008) manipulate recipient awareness of the game, with experimen”
- The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment (2009, background): “5 Framing effects have been found in prisoners’ dilemma games (Ross and Ward 1996 ;L iberman et al. 2004), public goods games (e.g., Andreoni 1995; Cookson 2000; Rege and Telle 2004), and dictator games (Eckel and Grossman 1996; Branas-Garza 2007).”
- VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS (2007, unknown): “More recently, Cookson (2000) observed that contribution levels returned on average to about 50% after each of three restarts in a repeated linear public-good game similar to ours. with a between- and within-treatment analysis estimating panel models that control for subject- and round-specific…”
- Pro-social behavior in a natural setting (2004, background): “Different ways of framing the same question institutionally can change the prevalence of pro-social behavior dramatically (for framing effects see, e.g. Lindenberg, 1992; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Elliott and Hayward, 1998; Cookson, 2000).”