The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public good situations
666 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/78bacea048d9197000cc088563b47b242f0c428b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Joseph Henrich
- John A. List
- Ernst Fehr
- Colin F. Camerer
- Herbert Gintis
- Steven D. Levitt
- Fredrik Carlsson
- Matthias Sutter
In General Decision Sciences
- Matthias Sutter
- John A. List
- Fredrik Carlsson
- Colin F. Camerer
- Ernst Fehr
- Imran Rasul
- Martin G. Kocher
- Steven D. Levitt
In Safety Research
- Ernst Fehr
- John A. List
- Joseph Henrich
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Colin F. Camerer
- Samuel Bowles
- Matthias Sutter
- Fredrik Carlsson
Citations in the corpus
- Field experiments in labor economics (2010, background): “whether such status concerns or prestige motives drive giving behavior Soetevent (2005), something that has been found to be the case in laboratory settings of public goods games (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004).”
- Altruism in Experiments (2010, background): “Bohnet and Frey (1999) find that reducing the social distance increases equal splits greatly, but in their anonymous treatments giving again averages 25 per cent (see also Rege and Telle, 2004).”
- Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations (2010, background): “With endogenous choice, the effects are stronger, even with the low leverage, and total profits have been significantly higher both with punishment and with reward than with the standard VCM.”
- The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment (2009, background): “5 Framing effects have been found in prisoners’ dilemma games (Ross and Ward 1996 ;L iberman et al. 2004), public goods games (e.g., Andreoni 1995; Cookson 2000; Rege and Telle 2004 ), and dictator games (Eckel and Grossman 1996; Branas-Garza 2007).”
- Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans (2013, background): “…helpingwhen observed and not helping when anonymous, and much research shows that people give less to others when their actions are anonymous (e.g. Barclay, 2004; Bereczkei et al., 2007; Coricelli et al., 2010; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Hoffman et al., 1994; Masclet et al., 2003; Rege & Telle, 2004).”
- “Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies (2005, background): “University student responders fall towards the upper end of the rejection scale (with more rejections than average), but still they rejected less often than groups like the Au, Gnau, Sangu farmers, and Hadza, all of whom rejected positive offers with greater frequency than did, for example, the Pitt”
- On the Norms of Charitable Giving in Islam: A Field Experiment (2012, background): “In a laboratory experiment Rege and Telle (2004) show that revealing 1Other religious writing make this rule even more precisestating that the reward for alms giving in afterlife in secret is seventy times that of giving publicly (Al-Baydawi, 1899).”
- Anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity: Evidence from voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica (2008, background): “There are several public good laboratory experiments that look at the role of anonymity; see e.g. Laury et al. (1995), Masclet et al. (2003), and Rege and Telle (2004).”