Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent

By Jean-Robert Tyran, Lars P. Feld. 2006

435 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3a7b135d4132f676efcf506ca308cbc11dd5d4ff

How researchers see this paper

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Citations in the corpus

Culture and Institutions (2015, positive): “A set of experiments on the impact of democratic rules on behavior (Tyran and Feld, 2006; Ertan, Page, and Putterman, 2010; and Sutter et al., 2010) find that punishment and rewards in”
VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS (2007, neutral): “Walker et al. (2000) (WGHO) are an exception.”
Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision (2012, background): “, 2007; Decker, Stiehler and Strobel, 2003) or by a third party (O’Gorman, Henrich and Van Vugt, 2009; Kosfeld, Okada and Riedl, 2008; Guillen, Schwieren and Staffiero, 2007; Tyran and Feld, 2006).”
Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes (2011, neutral): “…research assistance. a Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. b Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA. c Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria and Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, and CEPR (London).”
Laws and Norms (2012, positive): “Tyran and Feld (2006) show that “mild law”—penalties insuffi cient to deter free-riding—has no effect when it is exogenously imposed in a public-goods game, but significantly raises compliance when endogenously chosen through an initial vote by the participants.”
Organ donation in the lab: Preferences and votes on the priority rule (2016, background): “For example, Tyran and Feld (2006), Ertan et al. (2010), and Sutter et al. (2010) find that punishment and rewards in public-good games have a larger effect on cooperation when these mechanisms are implemented democratically than when they are imposed exogenously.”