The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment

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Corruption and culture: An Experimental Analysis (2010, background): “Note: The salience s is greater when the game is framed as corruption 75 Barr and Serra (2009) Barr and Serra (2009) Predictions What should we expect, assuming that non-monetary motivations matter?”
Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes (2013, unknown): “Such motivations can exist, and in fact a citizen who is sufficiently upset about the unfairness and immorality of the situation might be willing to report even without the incentive of material benefits.(11) The victim can also consider taking action if she believes to be serving a greater societal”
Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works (2018, unknown): “…(Azfar & Nelson 2007; Armantier & Boly 2011; Van Veldhuizen 2013), although the link between wages and propensity to engage in corruption is weaker in some studies than others (e.g., Barr et al. 2009) and sometimes contingent on increased monitoring to supplement rising pay (Schulze & Frank 2003).”
A controlled field experiment on corruption (2011, background): “Standard economic theory assumes the former, and several lab experiments support this hypothesis (see e.g. Abbink et al. 2002, Jacquemet 2005, Barr and Serra 2009).”