Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation

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Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Greater agency problems in large rms may necessitate higher equity incentives and thus more pay as a risk premium (Gayle and Miller, 2009).”
Within-Firm Pay Inequality (2017, methodology): “Following Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006), Giroud and Mueller (2011), and Edmans (2011), we use analysts’earnings forecasts to proxy for investors’expectations.”
The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market (2011, background): “Gayle and Miller(2009) show that firms that are more complex to manage or have greater agency problems (and thus stronger required incentives) pay their executives more.”
Difference that CEOs Make: An Assignment Model Approach (2007, unknown): “I thank David Autor, Abhijit Banerjee, Ernesto Dal Bó, Glenn Ellison, Ben Hermalin, Bengt Holmström, Jonathan Leonard, Michael Katz, and Thomas Philippon for helpful comments, and the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation and the Finnish Cultural Foundation for nancial support.”
Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives (2010, background): “Tervio (2009), Gabaix and Landier (2008), and Gayle and Miller (2009) reply that changes in firm scale may have affected the marginal return to managerial ability, which in turn changes the reservation utilities of all managers through labor market competition, which leads to a system of…”