Difference that CEOs Make: An Assignment Model Approach

By Marko Terviö. 2007

561 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0784f1c14bea77d8d6f1d63d9f8749e4780ec2c8

Citations in the corpus

• Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives (2015, unknown): “…findings provide consistent evidence that incentives are an important determinant of the match between firms and workers at all levels of the hierarchy.6 An important determinant of matching patterns, explored by Gabaix and Landier ð2008Þ and Terviö ð2008Þ, is firm heterogeneity in terms of size.”
• Within-Firm Pay Inequality (2017, unknown): “Others argue that high CEO pay is a reward for scarce managerial talent based on the competitive assignment of CEOs in market equilibrium (Terviö 2008; Gabaix and Landier 2008; Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier 2009; Edmans and Gabaix 2011).”
• An ill wind? Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation (2020, unknown): “Firm size has a significantly positive coefficient, consistent with the results in previous studies (Gabaix and Landier, 2008 or Tervio, 2008).”
• Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005 (2010, unknown): “Theories of the span of control (Lucas 1978; Rosen 1982, 1992), superstars (Rosen 1981), and competitive assignment of CEOs to heterogeneous firms (Tervio 2008; Gabaix and Landier 2008) predict a positive cross-sectional correlation between firm size and compensation.”
• Why Has House Price Dispersion Gone Up (2010, unknown): “Recent application of his assignment model to other markets are Gabaix and Landier (2008), Tervio (2008), and Costinot and Vogel (2008).”
• The Impact of Firm Prestige on Executive Compensation (2017, unknown): “A number of theoretical contributions emphasize the relevance of the participation constraint for compensation contracts, but empirical inferences on this constraint are only indirect (see Oyer, 2004; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2009).”
• On the mechanics of firm growth (2011, unknown): “[48] Tervi .”
• Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models (2015, unknown): “…in good markets with hedonic pricing (Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim, 2010), to trade (e.g., Costinot and Vogel, 2015) to the labour market (Tervio (2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008)) and to industrial organization (Bajari and Fox (2013), Fox (2018), Fox, Yang, and Hsu (2018)) among…”
• The Firm Size Distribution Across Countries and Skill-Biased Change in Entrepreneurial Technology (2018, unknown): “5Important references include Garicano (2000), Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Terviö (2008).”
• The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market (2011, unknown): “Gabaix and Landier (2008), Terviö (2008), and Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2010) present competitive assignment models of the managerial labor market, absent an agency problem.”
• Do Female Executives Make a Difference? The Impact of Female Leadership on Gender Gaps and Firm Performance (2019, unknown): “For theoretical contributions, see for example Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2008).”
• The Dynamics of Inequality (2016, unknown): “Weidmann (1980) and the more accessible Hunter and Nachtergaele (2001) and Stone and Goldbart (2009, Ch.”
• Financial Expert CEOs: CEO’s Work Experience and Firm’s Financial Policies (2014, unknown): “For instance, Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2008) study models of assortative matching based on observable firm characteristics (firm size) and unobservable manager characteristics (talent).”