The Construction of Preference: Do Defaults Save Lives?

By Eric J. Johnson, Daniel G. Goldstein. 2006

1,719 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4ace8c780847394ea345d2de8d8d9c444edbecab

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Warning: You are about to be Nudged (2015, background): “One reason that defaults can have an effect is that they are interpreted as implicit recommendations (e.g., Halpern et al. 2007; Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Johnson and Goldstein 2004; McKenzie et al. 2006).”
Unresolved questions in nudging research: Putting the psychology back in nudging (2017, neutral): “For example, the default nudge was already used by some countries who had an opt‐out (vs. opt‐in) strategy to increase organ donation (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), and nudges have been previously used to steer patients’ choices for a certain operation or therapy (McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky,…”
When should the Ask be a Nudge? The Effect of Default Amounts on Charitable Donations (2016, neutral): “Thus, default effects may sometimes reduce the effectiveness of additional information, rather than information reducing the impact of defaults, as previously suggested (Johnson and Goldstein 2003; McKenzie, Liersch and Finkelstein 2006).”
Nudge Versus Boost: How Coherent are Policy and Theory? (2015, neutral): “Studies conducted by proponents of both approaches—of choice situations as diverse as organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein 2003), retirement savings, and energy provider choice (Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2008)—have shown that setting a default significantly increases the probability that an agent…”
A Review of Nudges: Definitions, Justifications, Effectiveness (2020, neutral): “The first contributions to document their effectiveness are those by Johnson and Goldstein (2003, 2004), who use an online experiment and data from various countries to show that contexts where the default is to be organ donors see dramatically higher donation rates compared to contexts with the…”
Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2019, neutral): “Explanations based on procrastination of making active decisions that have featured prominently in the discussion of default effects in organ donor registration or 401(k) savings plans (e.g., Johnson and Goldstein 2003, Carroll et al. 2009) thus seem to be of limited relevance for our results.”
A Review and Taxonomy of Choice Architecture Techniques (2016, background): “…prominent examples of choice architecture, default setting: Several processes are discussed to cause default effects, among them loss aversion (Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, & Liu, 2011), implied endorsement (McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006), and decision inertia (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).”
American attitudes toward nudges (2016, neutral): “…problems, such as increasing retirement savings (Bernatzi & Thaler 1999; Madrian & Shea 2001; Choi et al. 2002; Choi et al. 2004), organ donations (Johnson & Goldstein 2003), charitable giving (Abadie & Gay 2006; McKenzie et al. 2006), and consumer health (Bushman 1998; Roberto et al. 2010;…”
The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger Than Its Gain? (2018, neutral): “It has been cited as an explanation for many well-known phenomena, such as the compromise effect (Simonson & Tversky, 1992), the disposition effect (Odean, 1998), the default effect (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), and the equity premium puzzle (i.e., Benartzi & Thaler, 1995).”
Prospect Theory and the Brain (2009, neutral): “…introduce new artifacts that “dampen . . . disparities by reducing the salience of the distinction between buying and selling tasks.” opt-in policy (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003), the tendency of consumer demand to be more sensitive to price increases than decreases (Hardie et al., 1993), and…”
Behavioral Finance: Quo Vadis? (2015, neutral): “One striking example has to do with organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003).”
Tastes, Castes, and Culture: The Influence of Society on Preferences (2011, neutral): “98% (Johnson and Goldstein 2003).”
Consumer decision making and aging: Current knowledge and future directions (2009, neutral): “…a non-trivial decision involving organ donation, with 42% of respondents presented with an opt-in question consenting to being donors, compared to 82% when an opt-out question was presented instead and 79% when there was no default and requiring an explicit choice (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003).”
Revealing Household Characteristics from Smart Meter Data (2014, background): “Experience shows that the number of customers who opt out is relatively low, as would be the number of individuals who actively decided for making their data available in an opt-in regime [52].”
Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice Overload (2010, background): “…quickly screens out unattractive options (Davey, Olson, and Wallenius 1994; Huber and Klein 1991; Tversky 1972), the choice of a default option (Johnson 2008; Johnson and Goldstein 2003), and the consideration-set model that balances search costs and expected outcomes (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990).”