Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers

By Marco Battaglini. 2005

249 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4a49f3fcb57de08f997e743ffe8b78f969adddd8

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In Management Information Systems

In Management Science and Operations Research

In Marketing

Citations in the corpus

Behavior-Based Price Discrimination and Customer Recognition (2007, background): “We also discuss the case where the consumer's preferences vary over time, as in Kennan (2001) and Battaglini (2004), who study short-term and long-term contracts, respectively.”
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World (2012, unknown): “Proposition 3 Let ξ∗ be the effort policy implicitly defined, for all t, all θ ∈ Θt, by39 ψ(ξt (θ )) = 1− η(θ1)J t 1(θ)ψ(ξt (θ)) (8)”
Persistent Private Information (2008, background): “The key issue in this model, of course, is that the agent alone observes bt, while the principal only observes the agent’s report of it, which I denote yt.”
Calibrated Incentive Contracts (2013, unknown): “The paper hopes to usefully complement the rich literature on optimal dynamic contracting (see for instance Rogerson (1985), Green (1987), Holmström and Milgrom (1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987), Laffont and Tirole (1988), and more recently Battaglini (2005), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais et ”
Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Persistent Shocks (2012, unknown): “The resetting property of the ex-ante optimal rule is related to the “no distortion at the top” result of standard static adverse selection models as well as dynamic models such as Battaglini (2005). In our framework, the lack of cross-subsidization across types implies that maximizing the reward to”
Discriminatory Information Disclosure (2017, unknown): “Suppose c = 1, fL = fH = 1 2 , and the support of v is [v, v] = [0, 3].”
Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks (2008, background): “Fernandez and Phelan (2000) numerically analyze a dynamic principal-agent problem where the agent's type follows a Markov process; and Battaglini (2003) studies long-term contracts that induce separation in similar settings.”
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach (2014, unknown): “τ=s ( −τ (θτ |θτ−1)/∂θτ−1 fτ (θτ |θτ−1) ) , (5)”
The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism (2008, unknown): “1 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1212660”
Dynamic Auctions: A Survey (2010, unknown): “Roughly speaking, by using a more sophisticated dynamic mechanism, the seller pays information rents to buyers in the initial period in order to incentivize the revelation of their initial private information, but subsequently extracts all remaining potential surplus.”