Managerial Turnover in a Changing World

By Daniel F. Garrett, Alessandro Pavan. Journal of Political Economy, 2012

125 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d5d1969ea626a7ba9adb65d51bc87c466b0cdebe

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Katharina Lewellen
2. Dirk Jenter
3. Amy K. Dittmar
4. Sanjai Bhagat
5. Brian J. Bolton
6. L. Field

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Katharina Lewellen
2. Dirk Jenter

Citations in the corpus

• Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012, unknown): “5 Garrett and Pavan (2009, 2010), and Zhu (2011).”
• Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction (2019, unknown): “7.2 Managerial Contracts and Hidden Actions Garrett and Pavan (2012) consider a model where a risk-neutral principal contracts with a risk-neutral manager whose type (productivity) changes over time.”
• Discriminatory Information Disclosure (2017, unknown): “We continue to assume that θ2 represents a type higher than θ1 in the sense that V2(ζ) > V1(ζ) and G(ζ|θ2) < G(ζ|θ1) for all ζ ∈ (ζ, ζ).(12) In this environment, we can define direct disclosure of ζ similarly as in Section 2; we focus on binary partitions of ζ.”
• Performance-Induced CEO Turnover (2020, background): “The evidence is consistent with a version of the Bayesian learning model in which CEO ability is subject to unobserved changes (Kim (1996), Garrett and Pavan (2012)).5 With changing CEO ability, boards optimally assign larger weights to more recent performance signals, which are most informative…”
• Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Learning models predict subgame-perfect termination after poor performance, as such performance signals low managerial quality (e.g. Jovanovic 1979; Harris and Holmström, 1982; Murphy, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Taylor, 2010; Garrett and Pavan, 2012).”
• CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment Framework (2013, unknown): “create value for the firm, and Garrett and Pavan (2010), who consider”