Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Persistent Shocks
By Marina Halac, Pierre Yared. 2012
145 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6491aa348470f959bd360e45a9e8289c5ea0506d
How researchers see this paper
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Marco Battaglini
- Stephen Coate
- Marina Azzimonti
- Thomas R. Palfrey
- Jan K. Brueckner
- Hilary A. Sigman
- Jesús López-Rodríguez
- A. García-Lorenzo
Citations in the corpus
- Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium (2022, unknown): “Halac and Yared (2015) extend their model of governments’ deficit bias and fiscal rules (Halac and Yared, 2014) to a multicountry setting in which a supranational fiscal rule affects the global interest rate.”
- The costs and benefits of balanced budget rules: Lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy (2016, methodology): “Halac and Yared (2014) adopt a dynamic mechanism design approach to the choice of fiscal rules in a simple political economy model of fiscal policy. Martin (2015) provides an evaluation of a variety of different monetary and fiscal constraints in the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). Hatchondo, ”