Sylvain Chassang

Economics and Econometrics · 2008–2020

A researcher in the Science corpus: 6 papers; trusts 26 researchers and is trusted by 6 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Economics and Econometrics — 43 citations into it; #12,149 of 23,481 by trust here, #20,730 by citations
• Management Science and Operations Research — 28 citations into it; #3,913 of 11,946 by trust here, #4,430 by citations
• Statistics and Probability — 23 citations into it; #10,931 of 12,932 by trust here, #7,914 by citations
• Sociology and Political Science — 19 citations into it
• Safety Research — 17 citations into it; #3,599 of 5,829 by trust here, #3,346 by citations
• Accounting — 12 citations into it
• Finance — 8 citations into it
• General Decision Sciences — 7 citations into it

Whom Sylvain Chassang trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Susan Athey
2. Andrew W. Lo
3. Edward Miguel
4. K. Bagwell
5. Robert Powell
6. Michael Kremer
7. S. Satyanath
8. Yuliy Sannikov
9. Donald B. Rubin
10. Nicholas Sambanis

Who trusts Sylvain Chassang overall

1. Gabriel D. Carroll
2. M. Lowe
3. J. Eggers
4. Oeindrila Dube
5. Bengt R. Holmstrom
6. Simon Board
7. Baoshan Ge
8. Abhijit Banerjee

Papers from Sylvain Chassang's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Sylvain Chassang trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach (Journal of Political Economy)
2. Targeting the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia (The American Economic Review)
3. USING RANDOMIZATION IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS RESEARCH: A TOOLKIT
4. Do Labor Market Policies have Displacement Effects? Evidence from a Clustered Randomized Experiment*
5. Collusion and Price Rigidity
6. A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
7. War as a Commitment Problem (International Organization)
8. A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent
9. Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information
10. Optimal Collusion with Private Information

Their papers

• Decision Theoretic Approaches to Experiment Design and External Validity (2016) — 115 citations
• Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts (2010) — 171 citations
• A Theory of Experimenters: Robustness, Randomization, and Balance (2020) — 78 citations
• Economic Shocks and Civil War (2009) — 230 citations
• Calibrated Incentive Contracts (2013) — 116 citations
• Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk (2008) — 154 citations