Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting and the Use of Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders

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Price versus Non‐Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts (2003, unknown): “Recent research by Bettis et al. (2001) indicates that some CEOs use these techniques, but the small sample size in Bettis et al.”
Paper millionaires: how valuable is stock to a stockholder who is restricted from selling it? ☆ (2001, unknown): “5This restriction may be lifted for individual trades by the underwriter in an “early release,” but this typically affects only a small fraction of the stock held by insiders (Brav and Gompers (1999)).”
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003, background): “Shares that are not sold after option exercise are often hedged or partially hedged in transactions that are not reported to the SEC (Bettis, Bizjack, and Lemmon (2001)).”
Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis (2009, unknown): “Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001) study all filings by all insiders between January 1996 and December 1998 and are only able to identify 85 19 The use of equity swaps disappeared in the mid-nineties because of their disadvantageous tax treatment. zero-cost collars.”
Executive stock options as mixed gambles: Revisiting the behavioral agency model (2013, unknown): “Other instruments for hedging risk include the sale of shares and the use of over-thecounter derivatives, such as zero-cost collars, equity swaps, and prepaid variable forward contracts (Bettis et al., 2001).”