Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis

By Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, René M. Stulz. 2009

296 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1593fd5457cc5c41d84e7fbd15dbb106afad5294

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In Accounting

1. Jonathan M. Williams
2. Tim King
3. Abhishek Srivastav
4. Francesco Vallascas
5. Jens Hagendorff
6. M. Malik

In Finance

1. Jonathan M. Williams
2. Tim King
3. Abhishek Srivastav
4. Francesco Vallascas
5. Jens Hagendorff

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide (2012, unknown): “In a contemporaneous study, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) focus on the”
• This Time Is the Same: Using Bank Performance in 1998 to Explain Bank Performance During the Recent Financial Crisis (2012, unknown): “These numbers are substantially smaller than the mean ($129 billion) and median ($15.5 billion) total bank assets one would obtain from banks that are in the S&P 1500 (e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)).”
• Financial Expertise of the Board, Risk Taking, and Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies (2014, unknown): “crisis (see Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010), and Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2010)). 4 In a recent study, Fernandes and Fich (2009) examine how financial expertise relates to bank performance during the crisis.”
• Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and Bank Performance in the Financial Crisis (2012, unknown): “Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) analyze the influence of CEO incentives and share ownership on bank performance and find no evidence for a better performance of banks in which the incentives provided by the CEO’s pay package are stronger (i.e., the fraction of equity-based compensation is higher).”
• Corporate Governance and Bank Insolvency Risk: International Evidence (2014, unknown): “Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find some evidence that US banks with CEOs”
• Executive Compensation: An Overview of Research on Corporate Practices and Proposed Reforms (2010, unknown): “Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) find that U.S. bank CEOs with more equity incentives suffered enormous wealth losses during the 2008 financial crisis and that their firms performed worse than others.”
• Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks (2013, unknown): “Our sample ends in 2006 to avoid contamination from the financial crisis, during which bank CEOs suffered large declines in their stock-based wealth (Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)), which may have materially altered their sensitivities to risk and return.”