Does the Presence of Venture Capitalists Improve the Survival Profile of IPO Firms

By B. A. Jain, Omesh Kini. 2000

320 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/33bf8e6a0214f554ce8800a3c5925a33dbace519

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Citations in the corpus

The contingent value of venture capitalist reputation (2011, background): “…market participants would otherwise infer from an extensive performance history, and/or that these prominent actors will contribute their own skills and resources to enhance the firm’s future prospects and potential (e.g. Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Jain and Kini, 2000; Pollock and Gulati, 2007).”
Small business survival and sample selection bias (2011, background): “These models typically depend on the distribution of the baseline hazard (hazard probability) and its association with a series of explanatory variables (Jain and Kini 2000).”
Patents and the Survival of Internet-related IPOs (2007, unknown): “In a related study, Jain & Kini (2000) find that the presence of venture capitalists prior to going public improves the survival prospects of IPO firms.”
How much prestige is enough? Assessing the value of multiple types of high-status affiliates for young firms (2010, background): “…benefits beyond infusions of capital, including access to the VC's social networks, advice and expertise in strategic planning, and assistance in recruiting experienced managers and prestigious underwriters (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Gompers and Lerner, 2004; Jain and Kini, 2000; Sahlman, 1990).”
Puttin' on the Ritz: Pre-Ipo Enlistment of Prestigious Affiliates as Deadline-Induced Remediation (2008, background): “…parties have been shown to influence perceptions of firm worthiness, as reflected in enlistment of prestigious underwriters (Higgins & Gulati, 2003), higher IPO valuations (Chemmanur & Paeglis, 2005; Sanders & Boivie, 2004), and other beneficial outcomes (Gulati & Higgins, 2006; Jain & Kini, 2000).”
Board structure and survival of new economy IPO firms (2012, unknown): “It is argued that larger offerings signal market confidence, more stringent monitoring (Lamberto and Rath, 2008), good prospects and higher probability of survival (Hensler, Rutherford and Springer, 1997; Jain and Kini 1999, 2000; Ritter, 1991).”
Real and accrual earnings management and IPO failure risk (2015, methodology): “Jain and Kini (2000) find evidence that IPO firms backed by VC have a higher probability of surviving in the following years than non-VC backed IPOs.”
Managerial Agents Watching other Agents: Multiple Agency Conflicts Regarding Underpricing in IPO Firms (2008, background): “Additionally, although Jain and Kini (2000) proposed that the presence of venture capital increases firm survival rates, their results (detailed in Table 1 on page 1058 of their study) show VC backing was associated with higher mortality at the two-year mark after IPO.9 Although a chi-square test ”
EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POWER ON SURVIVING TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE: THE CASE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS (2004, background): “Prior research has shown that VC backing is negatively associated with IPO firm failure ( Jain & Kini, 2000 ).”
Influencing Initial Public Offering Investors with Prestige: Signaling with Board Structures (2003, background): “Consequently, a firm's ability to complete a successful IPO may influence long-term measures of firm performance (e.g., Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Rahman & Yung, 1999; Ritter, 1991), as well as the firm's survival capabilities (e.g., Jain & Kini, 1999, 2000).”
Does success bring success? The post-offering lives of equity-crowdfunded firms (2017, background): “For instance, some studies categorize M&As as “censored survivors” (e.g., Jain and Kini, 2000), while others categorize them as “non-survivors” (e.g., Carpentier and Suret, 2011).”
Standing out from the crowd: the visibility-enhancing effects of IPO-related signals on alliance formation by entrepreneurial firms (2007, background): “While the IPO provides substantial financial resources and enhances the young firm’s legitimacy, significant uncertainties remain about the firm’s capabilities, and hence its future prospects, including its ability to survive (Fischer and Pollock, 2004; Jain and Kini, 2000; Pollock and Rindova, 2003”
Financial Constraints and the Failure of Innovation Projects (2018, unknown): “Indeed, venture capital may be critical at the initial stages by providing capital, and also by initiating screening and monitoring processes (Jain and Kini, 2000).”
IPO Survival in a Reputational Market (2012, unknown): “Schultz (1993), Seguin and Smoller (1997), Hensler et al (1997), Jain and Kini (1999, 2000, 2008), Fama and French (2004), Bradley et al (2006), Demers and Joos (2006), and Kooli and Meknassi (2007) examine IPO survival using US data, and Carpentier and Suret (forthcoming) use Canadian data.”
Constructing Deal Networks: Brokers as Network “Architects” in the U.S. IPO Market and Other Examples (2004, background): “With respect to firm quality, current research on IPOs suggests that factors such as the involvement of a reputable venture capitalist ( Jain & Kini, 2000 ), the presence of prominent board members (Stuart et al., 1999), and well-developed organizational practices for managing the firm’s human capit”