EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POWER ON SURVIVING TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE: THE CASE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

By Harald M. Fischer, Timothy G. Pollock. 2004

451 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a93c214f3163e36c4352fbbe71b9ce5e5a34c060

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Citations in the corpus

Lords of the Harvest: Third-Party Influence and Regulatory Approval of Genetically Modified Organisms (2013, unknown): “Extending this research, Fischer and Pollock (2004) explored failure risks of new ventures and found that particular actors, founder CEOs, served as shields that protected the ventures’ legitimacy from outside threats associated with initial public offering.”
IPO Research in Management and Entrepreneurship: Moving the Agenda Forward (2009, background): “Similarly, research suggests that the presence of one or more founders sends a valuable signal to investors of a firm’s potential value (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Nelson, 2003).”
Board structure and survival of new economy IPO firms (2012, unknown): “One school suggests that small boards are more likely to monitor management better since their members are less able to hide in a large group (Fischer and Pollock, 2004).”
Do CEOs Matter to Firm Strategic Actions and Firm Performance? A Meta-Analytic Investigation Based on Upper Echelons Theory (2016, background): “Likewise, scholars have found positive (Fischer & Pollock, 2004) or negative (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010) relationships between CEO age and firm performance.”
Standing out from the crowd: the visibility-enhancing effects of IPO-related signals on alliance formation by entrepreneurial firms (2007, background): “While the IPO provides substantial financial resources and enhances the young firm’s legitimacy, significant uncertainties remain about the firm’s capabilities, and hence its future prospects, including its ability to survive (Fischer and Pollock, 2004; Jain and Kini, 2000; Pollock and Rindova, 2003”
Impact of founder experience on exit intentions (2012, background): “Examining the relationships between social capital and founder-CEOs, Fischer and Pollock (2004) discovered that founder-CEO presence at the time of IPO interacts with CEO ownership to decrease the likelihood of firm failure.”
Experienced entrepreneurial founders, organizational capital, and venture capital funding (2007, background): “Nevertheless, the differing mechanisms do not imply different prediction in the hypotheses I examine, and so I follow the Fischer and Pollock (2004) strategy in abstracting away from the difference (though in future work, it would be interesting to better understand such mechanisms at work).26 The…”
The role of social capital in encouraging residents' pro-environmental behaviors in community-based ecotourism (2014, background): “Such a role for social capital has been empirically examined in a variety of domains such as operations management (see for example Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Krause, Handfield, & Tyler, 2007; Lawson, Tyler, & Cousins, 2006; Moran, 2005), human resource management (see for example Dess & Shaw, 2001;…”
Puttin' on the Ritz: Pre-Ipo Enlistment of Prestigious Affiliates as Deadline-Induced Remediation (2008, background): “In the context of software IPOs, three types of prestigious affiliates comprise the amount of overall preexisting prestige in place: prestigious executives, outside directors, and venture capital firms (e.g., Certo, 2003; Gulati & Higgins, 2003, 2006; Lee & Wahal, 2004).3, 4 Prestigious executives w”
Audit Committee Financial Expertise and Earnings Management: The Role of Status (2014, background): “For example, Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al.”
How much prestige is enough? Assessing the value of multiple types of high-status affiliates for young firms (2010, methodology): “They may have prominent analysts who will cover the firm (Krigman et al., 2001); through their own holdings they can stabilize post-IPO stock prices (Ellis et al., 2000); they can place shares with investors who are less likely to quickly trade the stock, thereby creating a more stable investor netw”