Altruism, agency, and the competitiveness of family firms

By W. Schulze, M. Lubatkin, Richard N. Dino. 2002

390 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/33228ada56e813743e336d7b4cf0b71d3038e77a

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Citations in the corpus

Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies (2011, background): “Family firms, in particular, could benefit from the involvement of external directors within the board, as a way of softening family ownership-related issues, such as dispute among powerful family owners (Miller et al. 2005) or the agency costs related to ‘‘altruism’’ that characterizes the relation”
Innovation in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review and Guidance for Future Research (2018, result): “This is in contrast to the asymmetrical-type altruism adopted by economic and agency theorists (Corbetta and Salvato 2004) assuming that parents’ altruism towards their children has negative consequences in terms of free-riding and/or children’s dependence upon parents (Schulze et al. 2002, 2003).”
The role of family ownership in international entrepreneurship: exploring nonlinear effects (2012, background): “Second, to overcome stagnation effects resulting from high family ownership and make a family firm more entrepreneurial, we support earlier suggestions (Schulze et al. 2002) that these firms should invest in governance mechanisms similar to those that widely held firms use to monitor management and ”
Owner‐Management, Firm Age, and Productivity in Italian Family Firms (2014, background): “conflicts of interests within the family, or distort incentives due to altruism or kinship behaviour (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2002).”
‘Types’ of private family firms: an exploratory conceptual and empirical analysis (2007, background): “408 PAUL WESTHEAD AND CAROLE HOWORTH Studies (Schulze et al. 2001, 2002, 2003, Westhead et al. 2001, 2002) have highlighted the important influences of firm ownership and governance as well as firm objectives on the strategic behaviour of family firms (Brunninge et al. 2005).”
The Effects of Family Firm Specific Sources of Tmt Diversity: The Moderating Role of Information Exchange Frequency (2010, neutral): “In other words, ownership in family firms is dispersed in a somewhat episodic and stepwise fashion over a long period of time, from parents to children or other close relatives (Schulze et al., 2002).”
Accounting Research in Family Firms: Theoretical and Empirical Challenges (2014, background): “…problem is that dominant family members – who are at the same time owners and managers – might take advantage of their position to serve personal interests to the detriment of other owners (Schulze et al., 2002; Schulze et al., 2001), for example through behaviours as shirking or free-riding.”
Family firms' risk perception: empirical evidence on the internationalization process (2008, background): “Various works have analysed this group of enterprises from the agency theory (Harvey, 1999; Gómez-Mejı́a et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze et al., 2002; Vilaseca, 2002; Morck and Yeung, 2003; Schulze et al., 2003).”
Ability and Willingness as Sufficiency Conditions for Family‐Oriented Particularistic Behavior: Implications for Theory and Empirical Studies (2014, background): “For example, even with the same extent of family involvement, personal attachment to the firm, self-identification with the firm, intention for intra-family succession, and desire to preserve socioemotional wealth can vary (Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2002, 2003a).”
Private Firms and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Economic and Management Perspective (2007, background): “Parental altruism may create governance problems in family firms (Schulze et al., 2002) although these problems can be mitigated if controlling owners exercise self-control in terms of the governance mechanisms they adopt and how they administer such mechanisms (Lubatkin et al., 2007).”
Entrepreneurial Risk Taking of Private Family Firms (2013, background): “However, the most common findings are that family firms are more averse to entrepreneurial risk than nonfamily firms (e.g., Jones, Makri, & Gómez-Mejía, 2008; Naldi et al., 2007; Short et al., 2009) and that family firms can suffer from strategic inertia over time (Schulze et al., 2002).”