Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation

By David Austen-Smith. Journal of Political Economy, 2000

283 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/322afbf189153b2de9a6a61cec9369af43f026b0

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Citations in the corpus

Do Electoral Cycles Differ Across Political Systems (2003, background): “Why do we pose the second question, i.e., why should we expect electoral cycles in fiscal policy to vary systematically with electoral rules and forms of government? A strong motivation can be found in a recent wave of theoretical research comparing fiscal policy outcomes under different versions of”
Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830-1938 (2006, background): “…on political participation (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Boix, 2001) and in the election rule (Austen-Smith, 2000; Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Chapters 8 and 9; Lizzeri and Persico, 2001) came about and how they might have affected fiscal…”
Female voting power: the contribution of women’s suffrage to the growth of social spending in Western Europe (1869–1960) (2008, unknown): “8 and 9), Austen-Smith (2000 ) a nd Milesi-Feretti et al. (2002).”
Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies (2007, unknown): “g∗J C = 1⁄2 H−1 g [ 1 2 ] if J = 1, 2 H−1 g [1], if J = 3, 4 .”
Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems (2004, background): “The only equilibria of Γ PR z that are compatible with (2) have both extreme parties compete to have λM accept the offer, hence the party structure has a heterogeneous party.”
Inequality and the Demand for Redistribution: Are the Assumptions of the New Growth Theory Valid? (2007, background): “Austen-Smith (2000) argues that the individual with the median income has decisive influence on the chosen tax rate only in majority-voting systems, but not under proportional representation.”
The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini (2009, background): “(Austen-Smith 2000) that since the number of parties presented in parliament is higher under proportional representation, tax rates will not be decided upon by one single party but will be the result of legislative bargaining between a variety of parties with different constituents.”
An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures (2004, methodology): “Typically, the choice of a particular coalitional bargaining procedure in models of govern6See, e.g., Austen-Smith (2000), Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), Baron (1991, 1993), Baron and Dier- meier (2001), Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Diermeier and Merlo (2000), and Merlo (1997).”
The size and composition of government expenditure (2007, background): “Milesi-Ferretti, Peroti, and Rostagno (2002), Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1998), and Austen-Smith (2000) each discuss the role of majoritarian vs. proportional electoral systems.”
Tax structure, size of government, and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938 (2009, methodology): “We begin by estimating the scal model (equations (1) to (4)) under the assumption of conditional independence, i.”
Constitutions and the resource curse (2008, background): “6 In Milesi-Ferretti et :al :; (2002) the reason for this association is a smaller district size, wheras in Austen-Smith (2000) the reason is plurality rule. productivity by almost 50%.”