The economic effects of constitutions: replicating—and extending—Persson and Tabellini
By L. Blume, Jens E. Müller, Stefan Voigt, Carsten Wolf. 2009
191 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/49fb5082cf84d5f7456d6a768d8ef7bdae64839b
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Political Science and International Relations
Citations in the corpus
- Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government? (2010, background): “Persson and Tabellini (2003), for example, derive the following results (see also Blume et al. 2009): (1) government spending is some 6% of GDP lower in presidential compared with parliamentary systems; (2) the size of the welfare state is about 2–3% lower in presidential systems; (3) presidential…”