Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies

By Torsten Persson, Gérard Roland, Guido Tabellini. 2007

379 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/493e4260c94baf84c02e14eae2889b265ab1fcbe

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Citations in the corpus

Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? (2006, background): “…proportionality of the electoral rule, though it is recognized that electoral systems do differ in other important ways (Lijphart, 1994; Hallerberg and Marier, 2004; and Persson, Roland, and Tabellini, 2005); especially, Hallerberg and Marier (2004) caution that the relationships may be nonlinear.”
Citizens, legislators, and executive disclosure: the political determinants of fiscal transparency (2013, methodology): “We take the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties represented, with independents treated as single-seat parties for this purpose, and subtract them from one (Persson et al. 2007: 174).”
Shades of brown and green: Party effects in proportional election systems (2014, background): “In models comparing proportional and majoritarian representational systems, the predicted di¤erences often rest on the assumption that individual parties, representing minorities or special interests, shape policy outcomes; see for example Persson et al. (2007).”
The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution (2011, methodology): “Although Persson and Tabellini (2000, 2003) argue that electoral rules affect the type of spending incumbent politicians choose, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2007) propose a model in which the effect of PR on government spending hinges on the greater probability of a coalition government under…”
Fiscal austerity and the trade-off between public investment and social spending (2009, background): “Recent scholarship in this field (Chang 2008; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Persson and Tabellini 2004; Persson et al. 2007) argues that electoral institutions have strong effects on fiscal policy.”