Do Electoral Cycles Differ Across Political Systems

By Guido Tabellini, Torsten Persson. 2003

197 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6824164e494e455436678a3c7e7fc22330a182b8

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments (2003, background): “Recently, a new type of models of electoral budget cycles – based on moral hazard rather than adverse selection – has been proposed by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Shi and Svensson (2002a).5 We Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments 69”
Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, unknown): “Persson and Tabellini (2002, 2003) find differences in political budget cycles across countries with different electoral rules and forms of government.”
Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities (2008, methodology): “Finally, we included demographic variables to remain in line with the literature (Shi and Svensson 2003; Persson and Tabellini 2003 ).”
Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures (2011, methodology): “the other hand, Persson & Tabellini (2002) , using a dataset of 60 democracies for the period 1960-1998, present evidence that the composition of PBCs is afiected by electoral rules (majoritarian versus proportional) and the form of government (presidential versus parliamentary)3.”
Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle? (2006, result): “Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Shi and Svensson (2002) find similar results.”
The political economy of passing climate change legislation: Evidence from a survey (2015, background): “In this respect climate change is not different to other reform efforts, and we were able to corroborate the pertinent results from other areas of public policy (Besley and Case, 1995; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; List and Sturm, 2006).”
Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting (2004, background): “5 Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), Gonzalez (2000), and Shi and Svensson (2002a).”
Political Cycles in Public Expenditure: Butter vs Guns (2017, background): “Persson and Tabellini (2002 ; 2003 ) and Albalate et al. (2012) argue that the nature of political system may affect fiscal policy maneuverability around elections.”
Do political variables affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions? New empirical evidence (2007, background): “Moreover, Persson and Tabellini (2002) report statistically significant tax decreases before elections in a sample of 60 democracies over the period 1960-1998.”
Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies (2005, unknown): “Constitutional Rules Persson and Tabellini (2003) argue that fiscal policy outcomes depend significantly on the nature of the government system – whether a country has a parliamentary or presidential system of government and whether voting for the legislature was primarily via proportional or majori”