Tax structure, size of government, and the extension of the voting franchise in Western Europe, 1860–1938

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The taxman tools up: An event history study of the introduction of the personal income tax (2009, background): “Finally, model (4) also shows that the degree of political competition does not seem to matter much for the likelihood of adopting the income tax.”
Why Can Modern Governments Tax so Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries (2016, background): “In addition to these hypotheses, a number of studies have pointed out that there are fiscal capacity constraints to government growth (e.g., Kau and Rubin, 1981; Bird, 1989, 1992; Peltzman, 1980; Riezman and Slemrod, 1987; Kenny and Winer, 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2009).”
Workers of the World, Unite! Franchise Extensions and the Threat of Revolution in Europe, 1820-1938 (2014, methodology): “First, a given ‘revolution shock’abroad has a smaller impact on suffrage reform (1) in countries where the insiders are particularly threatened by democracy and (2) in countries that are ‘distant’ from the source of the revolutionary event.”