Constitutions and the resource curse

By Jørgen Juel Andersen, S. Aslaksen. 2008

201 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Building and Construction, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/148d98868c8a1018c910a4aa7b07ef4bbf5ad89c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Building and Construction

1. F. van der ploeg
2. Erwin H. Bulte
3. J. Pettersson
4. R. Damania
5. Jesper Roine
6. A. Boschini
7. E. Papyrakis
8. A. James

In Economics and Econometrics

1. F. van der ploeg
2. A. Boschini
3. J. Pettersson
4. Jesper Roine
5. Erwin H. Bulte
6. R. Damania
7. S. Poelhekke
8. E. Papyrakis

In Sociology and Political Science

1. F. van der ploeg
2. Erwin H. Bulte
3. J. Pettersson
4. R. Damania
5. Jesper Roine
6. A. Boschini
7. S. Lin
8. Donghyeon Kim

Citations in the corpus

• The resource curse revisited and revised (2006, unknown): “Indeed, an analysis based on the Sachs–Warner ratio of resource exports as a share of GDP suggests the ‘‘curse’’ is more likely to materialize in presidential regimes and in non-democracies [3].”
• Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? (2011, background): “countries, estimates suggest that the resource curse occurs in presidential, not parliamentary democracies (Andersen and Aslaksen, 2008).”
• The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources (2011, unknown): “There is a large number of empirical papers which find evidence of this curse (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001; Strauss, 2000; Gylfason, 2004; Mehlum et al., 2006).”
• The Resource Curse and its Potential Reversal (2013, background): “8 This distinction between rules and outcomes is the basic motivation in Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) who carefully study the resource curse under different constitutional arrangements, finding that the standard resource curse result is indeed different for presidential and parliamentary as well as…”
• The Implications of Natural Resource Exports for Nonresource Trade (2016, unknown): “In the same spirit, Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) found that the negative effect is present in democratic presidential countries and not in parliamentary countries.”
• Determinants of Constitutional Change: Why Do Countries Change Their Form of Government? (2010, unknown): “The so-called resource curse has been identified as an important factor preventing development (e.g., Mehlum et al. 2006, Andersen and Aslaksen 2008).”
• Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse (2008, result): “…for openness, ‘TT’ captures growth of the log of terms of trade, ‘Inv’ is average real gross domestic investment, ‘RL’ is rule of law, ‘SPX’ is detailed empirical analysis, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model, refer to Andersen and Aslaksen (2006) and Bulte and Damania (2008).”