The Jeffords Effect*

By S. Jayachandran. Journal law and economy, 2006

349 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/308a94ff6125b9b0c75519c07d8f33151e4a56c2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Betting on Hitler—The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany (2005, neutral): “Jayachandran (2006) found that when Senator Jeffords switched party affiliation, losing the Republicans their majority, firms that had made substantial soft-dollar donations lost in value.”
Political Geography and Stock Returns: The Value and Risk Implications of Proximity to Political Power (2012, positive): “…2003), legislators may often draft, sponsor, and/or amend bills with an eye on firms located in their political home (in a broad, ideological sense and/or a narrow, geographical sense), especially those with close connections to the sponsor (see, e.g., Roberts, 1990; Jayachandran, 2006).”
Estimating the Value of Connections to Vice-President Cheney (2012, background): “…correlation between various measures of firm-level connections to government, such as lobbying, PAC expenditures, and politically affiliated board members, and measures of firm success (for example, Ansolabehere et al., 2004; Jayachandran,2006; Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012; Igan and Mishra,2012).”
Political activity and firm performance within nonmarket research: A review and international comparative assessment (2015, neutral): “, 2009; Hadani & Schuler, 2013; Hillman, 2005), the sudden death of politicians (Brown, 1996) and the transition of political power (Jayachandran, 2006; Yeh et al., 2013).”
Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value (2009, neutral): “12 As an additional event, we repeat the analysis in Jayachandran (2006) that considers the decision by Senator Jim Jeffords to leave the Republican Party in May 2001.”
Political connections, SEC enforcement and accounting quality (2009, positive): “and also following Karpoff et al. (2007), I control for the legislation that came into place during the sample period.”
Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns (2010, background): “Jayachandran (2006) analyzes the announcement effects of Senator Jim Jeffords’ decision to leave the Republican Party in 2001, a decision that transferred the control of the Senate from Republicans to Democrats.”
Contingent Political Capital and International Alliances: Evidence from South Korea (2007, background): “As Jayachandran (2006) showed, political contributions can still be a significant determinant of market capitalization, even in the U.S.”
Corporate donations and shareholder value (2017, neutral): “…with the value-enhancement theory, showing a negative effect on firm value when politicians tied to the firm lose power and a positive effect when the connected politicians get elected (Faccio & Parsley, 2009; Jayachandran, 2006; Cooper, Gulen & Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009).”
The Value of Connections in Turbulent Times: Evidence from the United States (2016, neutral): “4 For example, the so-called Je¤ords E¤ect— named after a Senator who switched parties unexpectedly, causing a change of control in the U.S. Senate— was found to be worth around 1% of …rm value (Jayachandran, 2006).”
Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information (2008, positive): “Our findings complement other evidence in empirical political economy that large, politically connected firms benefitted from favorable political regimes (Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001; Jayachandran, 2006; Knight, 2006; Snowberg et al., 2007).”
Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts (2013, background): “Furthermore, even if they do, Jayachandran (2006) raises the question whether donations have a causal effect on firm value or simply represent industry preferences.”
The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying (2014, background): “Studies of politically connected firms include Lenway, Morck, and Yeung (1996), Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006), Faccio, McConnell, and Masulis (2006), Jayachandran (2006), Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar (2011), Igan and Mishra (2011), and Coates (2011).”