Political connections, SEC enforcement and accounting quality
By Maria Correia. 2009
535 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/488d08fc4603a798bd9b5b8054e4f1c5814ba26c
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Citations in the corpus
- Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud (2014, unknown): “Previous research finds that political connections can mitigate the incidence of enforcement against corporate fraud in the US (Correia 2012; Yu and Yu 2012).”
- The Role of Stock Ownership by US Members of Congress on the Market for Political Favors (2014, unknown): “…Feijen, Laeven 2008; Desai and Olofsgard 2008; Ramanna 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2008, 2009; Cole 2009; Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2009; Correia 2009; Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010; Benmelech and Moskowitz 2010. communications business whose principal backers . . . had raised more than…”
- Does the External Monitoring Effect of Financial Analysts Deter Corporate Fraud in China? (2014, unknown): “However, similar issues also arise in developed economies such as the US; its Securities and Exchange Commission is also government funded, and is therefore also susceptible to political pressure (e.g. Correia 2009).”
- Is the SEC captured? Evidence from comment-letter reviews (2017, methodology): “Prior research has argued and shown that politicians serving on these oversight committees can affect SEC policies more effectively than other politicians (e.g., Weingast 1984; Correia 2014; Heese 2015).”
- Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China (2016, background): “Correia (2014) finds that a politically connected firm is the target of less enforcement action from regulators in securities violations.”
- Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Political Risk: Measurement and Effects (2016, unknown): “…reciprocate by distributing favors in the form of bailouts (Faccio et al. (2006); Tahoun and Van Lent (2016)), reduced government oversight (Correia (2014); Yu and Yu (2012)), more government contracts (Goldman et al. (2009); Tahoun (2014)), and reduced market competition (Benmelech and…”
- Religious Social Norms and Corporate Financial Reporting (2012, unknown): “AR represents an ex ante indicator of optimistic accruals since it identifies the risk of financial report misrepresentation due particularly to overstated (understated) revenue and assets (expenses and liabilities) (Correia, 2010).7 AR ranges from 0 to 100, with low risk receiving higher AR scores.”
- The Impact of Religion on Financial Reporting Irregularities (2012, unknown): “Correia (2009) and Price et al.”
- Detecting and Predicting Accounting Irregularities: A Comparison of Commercial and Academic Risk Measures (2011, unknown): “(2008) and Daines et al. (2010) also investigate this issue.”
- Do Political Connections Buffer Firms from or Bind Firms to the Government? A Study of Corporate Charitable Donations of Chinese Firms (2016, unknown): “Even in the United States, political connections have been shown to help firms when they deal with regulators (Correia 2014, Yu and Yu 2011).”
- Internal Audit Outsourcing and the Risk of Misleading or Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Did Sarbanes-Oxley Get It Wrong? (2012, unknown): “Academic research demonstrates that Audit Integrity’s risk measures are as good as or superior to other academic and commercial measures for predicting accounting restatements, SEC enforcement actions, and shareholder lawsuits (Correia 2009; Daines et al. 2010; Price et al. 2011).”